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This study is a first approach to the Preliminary Engineering Analysis of a Light Rail 
Transit (LRT) System. The study is divided into four interrelated parts. The first one 
consists on a presentation of the RAM Discipline, by a development of its theoretical 
foundations and the four Key Performance Indicators used through all the study. The 
methodology employed during the analysis and actual methods used for RAM analysis are 
also described in this section. Then, it has been developed a Failure Mode and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) with a subsequent Sensitive Analysis to ensure that the 
results are binary in terms of probability. With that, a consequent Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) has been carried out. After that, the third part of the study provides the LRT RAM 
Requirements Apportionment and last, but not least, Preventive/Corrective Actions have 
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1. Introduction 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Study can be characterized as a 
qualitative and quantitative indicator of the degree that a LRT system, or the sub-systems 
comprising the system, can be relied upon to function as specified and to be both available 
and reliable.  
1.1. Document Aims and Objectives 
The goal of a LRT System is to achieve a defined level of service in a given time. This 
RAM Study pretends to describe the confidence with which the system can guarantee the 
achievement of this goal.  
The objectives of this study will define the process for the specification of the Reliability, 
Availability, and Maintainability requirements for a LRT System. 
1.2. Document Scope 
This document describes: 
 The numerical RAM requirements at system level. 
 The methodology to achieve RAM targets and tools to be used. 
 The process to perform the preliminary engineering RAM apportionment to 
LRT systems showing that the overall system Service Availability will be 
achieved. The apportionment process relies on the System Breakdown 
Structure (SBS)  
 Definition of each Key Performance Indicator (KPI). 
 Means and procedures for the measurement of each KPI. 
 Definition of a RAM methodology that complies with EN 50126 [1] standard 
and CLC/TR 50126-3 [3]. 
 
This Preliminary LRT RAM Analysis will also provide evidence of the effective 
implementation of the EN 50126 life cycle and demonstrates the apportionment of RAM 
requirements to the LRT Systems and Subsystems such that the Service Availability 
requirements are satisfied. 
Finally, the RAM requirements provided in this document will contribute to a number of 
other engineering processes –implemented on other stages - including: 
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 Design by equipment and system topology selection guided by probabilistic 
reliability modelling and reliability demonstration through observed failure data. 
 System safety by estimating the likelihood of system failures due to random 
equipment failure. 
 Operational & maintenance by guiding the operational and maintenance 
procedures. 
 Continual improvement through a reliability growth program. 
1.3. Requirements 
Table 1 lists the numerical RAM requirements for the LRT System considered in this 
study. The requirement is expressed in terms of ‘service availability’.  
 
Service Availability Requirement 
The overall service availability shall be at least 99.8%. 
Table 1 Service availability requirements for the LRT System analyzed 
1.4. Justification of the usefulness 
This document will provide a RAM Preliminary Engineering Study about LRT System. 
But for what reason does the study focus on a LRT?  
Nowadays, the LRTs are considered a modern, comfortable, environmentally friendly, 
accessible, on-time, quick and safe mode of transport. It also optimizes urban space, as 
each LRT can carry even double passengers than one bus and it is the most accessible 
mode of transport, as it has direct access at street level, with no stairs, providing passengers 
the facility to ride into it. It is very light and quiet because it is an electric vehicle and it can 
also start and stop faster.  
But all these advantages for the LRT would not be possible if there was not a study that 
ensures its levels of safety and availability. Then, if the tramway was always delayed, 
taking to the passengers a lot of time waiting for it or anomalies with the subsystems 
happened and passengers could not finish their trip, they definitively would not use it. And 
that would mean a huge amount of money lost on its construction.  
In other words, without a good RAM study, none of the advantages mentioned before 
would be possible and this is why this document provides a Reliability, Availability and 
Maintainability Study in order to guarantee all the advantages that the Light Rail Transit 
System has, had and will have.  
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2. RAM Discipline 
2.1. RAM Concepts 
The Service Availability is the top objective of the RAM Requirements. This availability 
will be affected by a combination of failure rates, repair times and operational issues. The 
overall numerical availability requirements for an LRT  system will require modeling at the 
system level and then numerical reliability, availability and maintainability requirements 
apportioned across the subsystem level and then further to the component level.  
Numerical RAM requirements are typically expressed as:  
 Availability of systems to perform their intended functions 
 Mean time between failures, MTBF: reliability measure of a defined function (for 
repairable systems / components) 
 Mean time to failure, MTTF: reliability measure of a defined function (for non-
repairable systems / components) 
 Mean time to restore, MTTR, maintainability measure. 
 
A deep explanation of the following terms strongly related with the RAM discipline can be 
found in Appendix I: RAM Concepts. They perform an important role as they are essential 
for a correct understanding of the document 
 
 System Architecture 
 System Failures 
 Failure Rate 
 Reliability 
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2.2. Abbreviations and Definitions 
Abbreviation Meaning 
AFC Automatic Fare Collection 
APU Auxiliary Power Unit 
ATP Automatic Train Protection  
CCTV Closed Circuit Television  
CEN European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC European Committee for Electro Technical Standardization 
CLC/TR CENELEC Technical Report 
CS Commercial Speed 
E/E/PES Electrical /Electronic /Programmable Electronic Systems 
FMECA Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis 
FRACAS Failure Reporting, Analysis & Corrective Action System 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning  
LRT Light Railway Transit/Tram 
MCBF Mean Cycles Between Failure 
MDT Mean Down Time 
MEP Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing 
MKBF Mean Distance (Kilometres) Between Failures 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure 
MTBSAF Mean Time Between Service Affecting Failure 
MTTF Mean Time To Failure 
MTTR Mean Time To Restore 
MUT Mean Up Time 
MV Medium Voltage 
NEB Number of Emergency Braking 
NUS Number of Unexpected Stops  
O&M Operation and Maintenance 
OCC Operations Control Centre 
OCS Overhead Catenary System 
OHL Overhead Line 
PA Public Address 
PICS Key Performance Indicator for Commercial Speed 
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Abbreviation Meaning 
PIDT Key Performance Indicator for Departure Times 
PIS Passenger Information System  
PITE Key Performance Indicator for Train Evacuations 
PIUS Key Performance Indicator for Unscheduled Stops 
Q Unavailability 
RAM Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
RBD Reliability Block Diagrams 
ROW Right of way 
SA Service Availability 
SBS System Breakdown Structure 
ST Scheduled Trip 
TAL Trip Achievement Level 
TDT Total Down Time 
TUT Total Up Time 
W Failure Frequency  
1oo2 One out of two 
Table 2 Abbreviations likely to be encountered in this document 
 
For the purpose of this document, the terms and definitions given in EN 50126-1 [1] and 
the following apply: 
Term Meaning 
Accident 
An unintended event or series of events that results in death, injury, loss 
of system or environmental damage (EN50129). 
Apportionment 
A process whereby the dependability (RAMS) elements for a system are 
sub-divided between the various items which comprise the system to 
provide individual targets (EN50126). 
Assessment 
The process of analysis to determine whether the design authority and 
the validator have achieved a product that meets the specified 
requirements and to form a judgment as to whether the product is fit for 
its intended purpose (EN50129). 
Availability 
The ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required function 
under given conditions at a given instant in time or over a given time 
interval assuming that the required external resources are provided 
(EN50129). 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 




The ability of a system to perform one or several required functions 
under given conditions 
European 
Standard 
A European Standard (EN) is a standard that has been adopted by one 
of the three recognized European Standardization Organizations 
(ESOs): CEN, CENELEC or ETSI. It is produced by all interested 
parties through a transparent, open and consensus based process. 
Failure 
A deviation from a specified performance of a system. A failure is the 
consequence of a fault or error in the system (EN50129). 
Hazard A physical situation with a potential for human injury (EN50129). 
Reliability 
The probability that an item can perform a required function under 
given conditions for a given period of  time (EN50129) 
Risk 
The combination of frequency, or probability, and the consequence of a 
specified hazardous event (EN50129). 
Safety Freedom from unacceptable risk (EN50126). 
System 
System comprises subsystems that are combined to fulfil a required 
function under given condition. It is the highest level of description. 
System Life 
cycle 
The activities occurring during a period of time that starts when a 
system is conceived and end when the system is no longer available for 
use, is decommissioned and is disposed (EN50126). 
Trip 
A trip is the journey of one trainset from the first to the last stops on the 
scheduled route. The trip time is measured from the moment when the 
first train door starts the closing movement for leaving the first stop; to 
the moment when all train doors are fully open at the last stop. 
Validation 
The activity applied in order to demonstrate, by test and analysis, that 
the product meets in all respects its specified requirements (EN 50129). 
1oo2 
A configuration architecture of two redundant elements, performing the 
same function, where the function is executed by either of the two 
elements, and where both elements have to be in a failed state for the 
function to fail. 
Table 3 Definitions likely to be required in LRT System 
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3. Light Rail Transit (LRT) System  
3.1. LRT Project Background 
The RAM Study has been developed to plan the RAM management activities of a generic 
LRT and to illustrate how the RAM requirements would be apportioned, implemented, and 
demonstrated. In order to give a brief description of the project that this Study takes into 
account, it is important to keep in mind the following. 
The project taken into consideration presents a total right of way (ROW) for the LRT of 
27.5km, and provides service to a large area of land, with different neighborhoods.  This 
network is configured in the following way: 
 
 Line 1 – 15.1 km long and 24 stations 
 Line 2 – 12.4 km long and 21 stations 
 
The double tracked network would be integrated and harmonized with other Public 
Transport modes, accessible for the mobility impaired people, safe, environmentally 
friendly and adapted to the weather of the emplacement.  
The network considered in this study is intended to be street-running. At the same time the 
network will be segregated from traffic in order to achieve shorter trip times that will help 
to improve the passenger experience. 
The sustainability goals to be met with this kind of transport system will include, but not be 
limited to: 
 Minimizing impact on environment  
 Acoustic and vibration mitigation 
 Improving mobility for inhabitants 
 
 
Figure 1 Night perspective of an LRT stop. 
 http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.aspxfile=data/theuae/2012/March/theuae_March851.xml 
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So, after the description of the infrastructure where the LRT would run, it is important to 
give an explanation specifying the LRT system.  
A Light Rail Transit System is a system of transport used mainly for the transport of 
passengers, employing parallel rails which provide support and guidance for vehicles 
carried on flanged wheels, and in respect of which: 
a) The rails are laid in a place to which the public have access. 
b) On any part of the system, the permitted speed of operation of the vehicles is 
limited to that which enables the driver of any such vehicle to stop it within the 
distance he can see to be clear ahead.  
 
LRT systems can be divided into three categories:  
Integrated on-street 
In this category the operation is by line-of-sight, the rails are laid in the highway and the 
part of the highway occupied by the rails may be capable of being used by other vehicles or 
by pedestrians.  
 
Segregated on-street  
In this category the operation is by line-of-sight, the rails are laid within the boundaries of a 
highway and the part of the highway occupied by the rails may be crossed by pedestrians, 
and by other vehicles at designated crossing points, but is not normally shared with other 
road vehicles except vehicles for maintenance purposes.  
Off-street  
In this category the operation is by either line-of-sight or signaled, or by a combination of 
the two, the track is wholly segregated form any highway, and the alignment is wholly 
separated from any highway.  
The system analyzed in this Study can be identified as the second of the categories, which 
means an segregated on-street Light Rail Transit System.  
 
Figure 2 An LRT System running on-street. 
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3.2. Interfaces to Other Programmes and Activities 
3.2.1. Links with Safety Activities 
It is considered that particular equipment defined to achieve the safety and comfort of 
passengers shall have a high level of reliability and availability. Equipment such as 
transmission systems that take part in the implementation of the safety functions shall also 
have a high level of reliability and availability. 
Safety requirements would have to be set through the process defined in a System Safety 
Management Plan and shall take them into account in the RAM analysis. The management 
of reliability, availability and maintainability is an important contribution to system safety 
and evidence of that management will be an important element of the LRT safety case. 
Although, this links are out of the scope of this LRT Study. A next stage study with this 
document base will consider this section in its scope.  
3.2.2. Links with Quality 
It would have to be considered that RAM requirements of the system are based upon its 
level of quality: a Quality Management System would have to be defined in order to 
minimize errors and control their impact throughout the life-cycle of the system. 
Again, this links are out of the scope of this LRT Study, but a next stage study would have 
to take this section into consideration.  
3.3. Assumptions 
The following events are excluded from the scope of this LRT Study for the RAM 
Analysis: 
 Declared national disaster such as: earthquake, overall flooding, etc. 
 Terrorism, sabotage, vandalism, madness, war. 
 Use of system for other than intended purpose. 
 Incorrect maintenance done by other personnel. 
 Deliberate infringement to Safety and Health regulations by individuals. 
 Deliberate infringement to procedures and instructions by individuals. 
 Electricity supplied out of the specified values. 
 Wrongful suspension or operation of the LRT system by the LRT Operator. 
 Overrun of maintenance times by the LRT Operator. 
Additionally, this specification does not concern the safety-related requirements and 
actions defined in order to ensure the safety of the transportation system. These 
requirements and actions would be managed by a safety organization. 
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3.4. Applicable Standards 
Reference Title 
[1]  
EN 50126-1:1999 Railway Applications - The specification and 
demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety 
(RAMS), Part 1: Basic requirements and generic process. 
[2]  
CLC/TR 50126-2:2007 Railway Applications - The specification and 
demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety 
(RAMS), Part 2: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for safety. 
[3]  
CLC/TR 50126-3:2006 - Railway applications - The specification and 
demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
(RAMS) - Part 3: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for rolling stock 
RAM 
[4]  
EN 50128:2001 Railway Applications - Communication, signalling and 
processing systems - software for railway control and protection systems. 
[5]  
EN 50129:2003 Railway Applications - Communication, signalling and 
processing systems - safety related electronic systems for signalling. 
[6]  
NFPA 130: Standard for fixed guide way transit and passenger rail 
systems. 
[7]  
Engineering Safety Management (The Yellow Book) Fundamentals and 
Guidance), Issue 4 (withdrawn), UK Rail Safety and Standards Board 
[8]  
ERA/REC/02-2012/SAF European Railway Agency Recommendation on 
the revision of the common safety method on risk evaluation and 
assessment and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 
[9]  ISO 9001:2008 – Requirements for Quality Management System 
[10]  
IEC 61124 Reliability testing — Compliance tests for constant failure rate 
and constant failure intensity 
[11]  IEC 61025:2006 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
[12]  MIL-HDBK-472 Maintainability Prediction and Notice 1 1984 
[13]  
MIL-HDBK-470A Department Of Defense Handbook, Designing And 
Developing Maintainable Products And Systems. 
[14]  
MIL-STD-2155(AS) Department Of Defense. Failure Reporting, Analysis 
and Corrective Action System. 
[15]  
Dr David J Smith, 2011, Reliability, Maintainability and Risk 8e: Practical 
Methods for Engineers including Reliability Centered Maintenance and 
Safety-Related Systems. Ed. Butterworth-Heinemann 
[16]  
H. Kumamoto, E. J. Henley, Probabilistic Risk Assessment and 
Management for Engineers and Scientists, IEEE Press, 1996 
Table 4 Document references 
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3.5. LRT System Definition 
3.5.1. Systems Breakdown Structure 
The activities to be developed during the LRT project have been identified and structured 
following a System Breakdown Structure (SBS). The project has been organized in a tree 
structure taking into account phases of execution and work packages which have been 
clearly identified to avoid overlaps, ambiguities and redundancies.  
The level of detail of the SBS has been driven by the following criteria: all the systems and 
project parts shall be clearly identified by their functional requirements and the definition 
of their interfaces with other systems and project parts. They can be designed and 
developed independently following those specifications and afterwards every system can 
be integrated with others in the same hierarchical level constituting their hierarchical parent 
in the SBS. 
Figure 3 shows the SBS for LRT system. It consists of the following levels: 
 Level 01 - Project 
 Level 02 - Grouping 
 Level 03 - Systems 
 Level 04 - Subsystems 
Level 01 – Project. It is made up by LRT System. 
Level 02 – Grouping. Project parts in that level are the main systems’ groups of the 
transport system. 
Level 03 – Systems. They correspond to the work packages or engineering disciplines 
which take part in the engineering design process. 
Level 04 – Subsystems. They correspond to the subdivision of one system in multiple work 
packages which can be specified individually. 
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Figure 3  Systems Breakdown Structure 
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4. RAM Requirements  
4.1. Numerical RAM Requirements 
The desired RAM characteristics, usually expressed in terms of availability at the highest 
system level, are specified in the sections below. They will be:  
 Estimated at the beginning of the system life-cycle. 
 Progressively demonstrated through predictive modelling.  
 Measured during actual passenger operations.  
This analysis will define for each subsystem the Reliability, Availability and 
Maintainability objectives to be complied with in order to meet the specified RAM 
targets. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability objectives will be expressed in 
common RAM indicators:  
 System / sub-system / component failure rates or MTBF/MTTF 
 System / sub-system / component minimum availability 
 System / sub-system / component maximum MTTR 
The numerical RAM requirements specified in this document are classified by:  
 Service availability requirements 
4.2. Key Performance Indicators for Service Availability (SA) 
Table 5 lists the numerical RAM requirements established as a minimum for the LRT 
System. The requirements are expressed in terms of ‘service availability’. The guiding 
principle is that the ‘service availability’ should be the same for all lines regardless of 
length or complexity. 
System Service Availability Requirement 
LRT The overall service availability shall be at least 99.8%. 
Table 5 Service availability requirements for LRT System 
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Service Availability measures the level of achievement of the scheduled transportation 
service of the System. Service Availability refers to the measurement of each train’s 
availability or the whole schedule.  
The Service Availability is calculated using the following formula:  
   
∑(   )
  
   (1)  
Where:  
    is the Service Availability of the System over a considered period, 
  ∑  (   ) is the sum of the Trip1 Achievement Levels of all scheduled trips 
over the considered period, 
    is the number of scheduled trips over the considered period. 
 
The Trip Achievement Level (   ) in equation (1) is defined for each scheduled trip as 
follows:  
                             (2)  
 
Where the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are defined as follows: 
 PIDT: Departure Times – This quality criterion indicates if the considered 
scheduled trip is performed or missed, taking into account the actual headway 
with the previous trip compared with the scheduled headway. 
 PICS: Commercial Speed – This quality criterion indicates if the actual 
commercial speed of the train is lower, equal or higher than the scheduled 
commercial speed.  
 PITE: Train Evacuations - This quality criterion considers a train evacuation 
when the train is evacuated between two stations during the trip.  
 PIUS: Unexpected Stops - This quality criterion affects the level of achievement 
of the trip if the train stops outside the nominal stopping points in station, taking 
into account the number of unexpected stops during the trip (NUS) and the 
number of emergency braking during the trip (NEB).  
 
It must be noted that equation (1) for the definition of the Service Availability can be 
used for actual measurement of the system’s performance during the Defects and 
Liability, and Operation phases. The Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action 
                                               
1
 A trip is the journey of one trainset from the first to the last station on the scheduled route. 
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System (FRACAS, see [14]) can help collecting the necessary data to measure actual 
LRT performance for each of the abovementioned Performance Indicators. The 
accomplished Service Availability will result from direct application of equation (1). 
However, as it is a Preliminary Engineering Study for the LRT System, the Service 
Availability has to be predicted statistically, that is: 
   
∑     
  
   
  
 
         
  
        
In other words, assuming that all scheduled trips (ST) over the considered period have the 
same failure distribution                  (i.e. failures can affect any trip over the 
considered period with equal probability), the predictive results of the analysis of a single 
Trip can then be applicable to the operation during the considered period. 
       is modelled and calculated in section 6.5 (Fault Tree Analysis). 
 
4.2.1. Performance Indicator for Departure Times (PIDT) 
This measure quantifies the compliance with the planned schedule and headway. The 
PIDT value is either one or zero. PIDT is calculated as follows: 
                      
        
        
     (3)  
                      
        
        
     (4)  
                           
        
        
     (5)  
                           
        
        
     (6)  
 
Where: 
                is the first scheduled trip 
                     are all trips following the first scheduled trip 
      is the next scheduled departure time. 
     is the actual departure time of a scheduled trip. 
      is the previous scheduled departure time 
      is the previous actual departure time 
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The following conditions apply: 
      is calculated on a per trip basis and is based on the departure time from the 
first scheduled station. 
 An actual trip can be associated to one scheduled trip. 
 A scheduled trip can be associated to one actual trip. 
 The first actual trip that departs after scheduled time for the last trip shall be 
associated with the last scheduled trip; all other scheduled trips shall be 
associated with the first actual trip that departed between the scheduled departure 
time and the scheduled departure time of the next trip. 
 The      is zero for a scheduled trip that cannot be associated to an actual trip. 
 Actual departure times shall be considered to have deviated from scheduled 
departure time if the actual departure time is 31 seconds, or more, after scheduled 
departure time. 
 
Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the several departure times taking part in the 
Performance Indicator.  
 
Figure 4 Departure times for scheduled trips 
4.2.2. Performance Indicator for Commercial Speed (PICS) 
This measure quantifies the compliance with the expected commercial speed. PICS is 
calculated as follows: 
            
                       
                          
    
otherwise       
                       
                          
 













Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 
Cèlia Nadal Reales  24 
 
The following conditions apply: 
      is calculated on a per trip basis. 
 Actual commercial speed is the average speed of the LRT. 
The measurement period is from the close door command at the first scheduled 
stop until the door open command at the last scheduled stop. 
 
4.2.3. Performance Indicator for Train Evacuations Stops (PITE) 
If a train evacuation occurs in the guideway between stops, then PITE will be 0 for that 
trip, otherwise it shall be 1. 
4.2.4. Performance Indicator for Unscheduled Stops (PIUS) 
This measure quantifies the ability of the LRT to consistently run without unscheduled 
stops.      is calculated as follows: 
                         (8)  
Where: 
     is the number of unscheduled2 stops per trip. 
     is the number of emergency stops per trip. 
Conditions: 
      is calculated on a per trip basis. 
      does not include evacuations which are considered by Performance 
Indicator for train evacuations Stops (PITE). 
4.3. RAM Apportionment 
Based on RAM analysis technique, Railway Support Industry will derive and apportion 
‘subsystems level’ RAM requirements and Contractors will be required to derive and 
apportion ‘component level’ RAM requirements. These numerical RAM requirements 
will be used to calculate a ‘system level’ availability estimation. This is shown in Figure 
5 below. 
 
                                               
2
 An unscheduled stop is an unplanned stop between stations of any duration. 
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Figure 5 Apportionment of RAM Requirements 
4.3.1. Methodology of Analysis 
This section shows the methodology of analysis that will be applied to the apportionment 
of RAM requirements for the LRT System. Firstly the overall flow chart will be discussed 
showing the steps to be taken in the RAM performance demonstration. The flow chart is 
shown in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6 RAM justification method flow chart  
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Each of these steps is described below: 
1. Analyze the scope of the RAM demonstration. The ultimate goal is to 
demonstrate RAM performances in terms of an overall Service Availability.  
2. The System Selection method will further determine the scope of the analysis. As 
shown in Figure 7, the process for selecting the systems to be included in the 
analysis considers the RAM Scope, whether the system is essential to or has an 
impact on the Service Availability (SA), or whether the system has been designed 
according to an international standard for structural components.  
Only electro-mechanical / electrical / electronic systems, that are essential to 
meet the required Service Availability, and that are not designed according to an 




Figure 7 System selection method 
 
3. System Analysis consists in identifying the critical systems within the System 
Breakdown Structure (SBS). This analysis is performed on the systems that result 
from the System Selection Method. Section 3.5.1  it has been showed this LRT 
System Breakdown Structure. 
4. For the selected items, the effects of potential failures on the Service Availability 
will be described, indicating the occurrence rate of each failure mode. For this 
Preliminary Engineering Study, the FMECA will be completed at subsystem 
level. 
5. In order to determine which failure modes, as identified in the FMECA, should 
be included in the fault tree analysis, the Failure Mode Selection Method shown 
in Figure 8 has been employed. 
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Figure 8  Failure mode selection  
 
6. Following the Failure Mode Selection Method, a quantitative FTA will be 
developed. That is, failure data will be incorporated into the Fault Tree, with the 
Service Availability (SA) as the top event of the FTA with a target availability of 
99.8%. It will necessary to determine how the different subsystems interact to 
provoke each of the failures that affect the Service Availability in terms of:  
a. SERVICE AVAILABILITY (SA):  
i. Departure times (PIDT)  
ii. Commercial speed (PICS)  
iii. Train evacuations (PITE)  
iv. Unscheduled stops (PIUS)  
Specific fault tree models will be developed to analyse failures leading to each of 
the following top events (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9  Quantitative fault tree analysis of the service availability  
 
7. Finally, RAM allocation and Performance demonstration will be carried out. For 
every subsystem, a maximum allowable unavailability will be allocated (the 
constraint being the top event – i.e. Service Availability must be greater than 
99.8%). This shall demonstrate that the proposed LRT System design meets the 
availability requirements, and will apportion non-availability requirements to the 
subsystems. 
It must be noted that the use of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Reliability Block Diagrams 
(RBD) is just a matter of choice. The quantitative results of availability are exactly the 
same for FTA and RBD (math formulation is the same for both) as long as the same 
software package is used. In this Study I have opted for using FTAs in the RAM analysis 
and demonstration, as these are better suited to show visually the interrelations of the 
systems and subsystems to provoke the failure
3
. 
                                               
3
  The fault tree analysis is a widely accepted method of presenting the interaction of system, 
subsystem and component failures as described in [11], and [2] §E.9. 
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5. RAM Programme Plan 
5.1. Methods and Tools 
The methods and tools that can be employed in RAM analysis will include, but not be 
limited, to the ones described in this section. In section 6.1 can be found the particular 
methods used in this study in order to demonstrate the SA of the LRT System. This 
section has been set, therefore, with the intention of providing different methods used in 
RAM studies, although not all of them are used in this particular study.     
5.1.1.    Failure Mode, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Aim: To analyse a system design, by examining systematically all possible sources of 
failure of a system's components and determining the effects of these failures on the 
behaviour and availability of the system. 
Description: The analysis usually takes place through a meeting of engineers. Each 
component of a system is analysed in turn to give a set of failure modes for the 
component, their causes and effects (locally and at overall system level), detection 
procedures and recommendations. If the recommendations are acted upon, they are 
documented as remedial action taken. 
References: 
 IEC 60812:2006, Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
 Risk Assessment and Risk Management for the Chemical Process Industry H. R. 
Greenberg J. J. Cramer, John Wiley and Sons, 1991 
 Reliability Technology. A. E. Green, A. J. Bourne, Wiley-Interscience. 1972 
In the preliminary studies, the FMECA will contain the following information:  
 Failure Mode Code: An acronym and serial number identification. 
 Description: Explanation of the failure mode, describing how the 
system/subsystem or equipment may fail.  
 Effects on the Service Availability: Refers to the Key Performance Indicators 
affected (refer section 4.2). 
 Effects on Operation: Contains the consequences of this Failure Mode on the 
Operation of the LRT.  
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 
Cèlia Nadal Reales  30 
 
 Failure Rate: Frequency of occurrence of this Failure Mode, inverse of the Mean 
Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
 Restore Rate: Inverse of the Mean Time To Restore (MTTR). 
 Criticality: Criticality of components which could result in injury, damage or 
system degradation through single-point failures, in order to determine which 
components might need special attention and necessary control measures during 
design or operation. 
Required inputs: Prior to the completion of FMECA, functional analysis is necessary for 
understanding the function of each sub-system. By completing this it is possible to 
understand the functional failure modes of each sub-system, and determine the criticality 
of failures that result in, or contribute to, major accidents and/or service disruptions. 
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5.1.2.    Cause Consequence Diagrams 
Aim: To analyse and model, in a compact diagrammatic form, the sequence of events that 
can develop in a system as a consequence of combinations of basic events. 
Description: The technique can be regarded as a combination of Fault Tree and Event 
Tree Analysis
4
. It starts from a critical (initiating) event and the consequence graph is 
traced forwards by using YES/NO gates describing success and failure of some 
operations. This allows building event sequences leading either to an accident or to a 
controlled situation. Then cause graphs (i.e. fault trees) are built for each failure. Then 
starting from an accidental situation and going in the backward direction gives a global 
fault tree with this accidental situation as top event. In the forward direction the possible 
consequences arising from an event are determined. The diagrams can be used for 
generating fault trees and to compute the probability of occurrence of certain critical 
consequences. It can also be used to produce event trees. 
The following figure shows a basic example of a cause consequence approach:  
 
Sub-system 1 Sub-system 2 Sub-system 3






Figure 10 Example of a Cause Consequence Diagram 
 
References: 
 IEC 62502. Analysis techniques for dependability - Event tree analysis (ETA) 
 The Cause Consequence Diagram Method as a Basis for Quantitative Accident 
Analysis. B. S. Nielsen, Danish Atomic Energy Commission. Riso-M-1374, 1971 
                                               
4
 See section 5.1.3 
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5.1.3.    Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Aim: To model, in a diagrammatic form, the sequence of events that can develop in a 
system after an initiating event, and thereby indicate how serious consequences can 
occur. An event tree is difficult to build from scratch and using consequence diagram is 
helpful. 
Description: On the top of the diagram is written the sequence conditions that are 
relevant in the progression of events that follow the initiating event. Starting under the 
initiating event, which is the target of the analysis, a line is drawn to the first condition in 
the sequence. There the diagram branches off into "yes" and "no" branches, describing 
how future events depend on the condition. For each of these branches, one continues to 
the next condition in a similar way. Not all conditions are, however, relevant for all 
branches. One continues to the end of the sequence, and each branch of the tree 
constructed in this way represents a possible consequence. The event tree can be used to 
compute the probability of the various consequences, based on the probability and 











Figure 11 Example of an Event Tree 
References: 
 IEC 62502, Analysis techniques for dependability - Event tree analysis (ETA) 
 Risk Assessment and Risk Management for the Chemical Process Industry. H.R. 
Greenberg, J.J. Cramer, John Wiley and Sons, 1991. 
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5.1.4.    Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Aim: To aid in the analysis of events, or combinations of events, that will lead to a hazard 
or serious consequence and to perform the probability calculation of the top event. 
Description: Starting at an event which would be the immediate cause of a hazard or 
serious consequence (the "top event"), analysis is carried out in order to identify the 
causes of this event. This is done in several steps through the use of logical operators 
(and, or, etc.). Intermediate causes are analysed in the same way, and so on, back to basic 
events where analysis stops. The method is graphical, and a set of standardized symbols 
are used to draw the fault tree. At the end of the analysis, the fault tree represents the 
logical function linking the basic events (generally components failures) to the top event 
(the overall system failure).The technique is mainly intended for the analysis of hardware 
systems, but there have also been attempts to apply this approach to software failure 
analysis. This technique can be used qualitatively for failure analysis (identification 
failure scenarios: minimal cut sets or prime implicants), semi quantitatively (by ranking 
scenarios according to their probabilities) and quantitatively for probabilistic calculations 








Figure 12   Example of a Fault Tree 
 
References: 
 IEC 61025:2006, Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
 From safety analysis to software requirements. K.M. Hansen, A.P. Ravn, A.P, V 
Stavridou. IEEE Trans Software Engineering, Volume 24, Issue 7, Jul 1998 
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5.1.5.    Markov Models 
Aim: To model the behaviour of the system by a state transition graph and to evaluate 
probabilistic system parameters (e.g., un-reliability, un-availability, MTTF, MUT, MDT, 
etc.) of a system. 
Description: It is a finite state automaton represented by a directed graph. The nodes 
(circles) represent the states and the edges (arrows) between nodes represent the 
transitions (failure, repairs, etc.) occurring between the states. Edges are weighted with 
the corresponding failure rates or repair rates. The fundamental property of homogeneous 
Markov processes is that the future depends only of the present: a change of state, N, to a 
subsequent state, N+1, is independent of the previous state, N-l. This implies that all the 
probabilistic laws of the models are exponential. 
The failure events, states and rates can be detailed in such a way that a precise description 
of the system is obtained, for example detected or undetected failures, manifestation of a 
larger failure, etc. Proof test intervals may also be modeled properly by using the so-
called multi-phase Markov processes where the probabilities of the states at the end of 
one phase (e.g. just before a proof test) can be used to calculate the initial conditions for 
the next phase (e.g. the probabilities of the various states after a proof test has been 
performed). 
The Markov technique is suitable for modeling multiple systems in which the level of 
redundancy varies with time due to component failure and repair. Other classical 
methods, for example, FMEA and FTA, cannot readily be adapted to modeling the effects 
of failures throughout the lifecycle of the system since no simple combinatorial formulae 
exist for calculating the corresponding probabilities. 
References: 
 IEC 61 165:2006, Application of Markov techniques  
 The Theory of Stochastic Processes. R. E. Cox and H. D. Miller, Methuen and 
Co. Ltd., London, UK, 1963 
 Finite MARKOV Chains. J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell. D. Van Nostrand 
Company Inc, Princeton, 1959 
 The Theory and Practice of Reliable System Design. D. P. Siewiorek and R. S. 
Swarz, Digital Press, 1982 
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5.1.6.    Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) 
Aim: To model, in a diagrammatic form, the set of events that must take place and 
conditions which must be fulfilled for a successful operation of a system or a task. It is 
more a method of representation than a method of analysis. 
Description: The target of the analysis is represented as a success path consisting of 
blocks, lines and logical junctions. A success path starts from one side of the diagram and 
continues via the blocks and junctions to the other side of the diagram. A block represents 
a condition or an event, and the path can pass it if the condition is true or the event has 
taken place. If the path comes to a junction, it continues if the logic of the junction is 
fulfilled. If it reaches a vertex, it may continue along all outgoing lines. If it exists at least 
one success path through the diagram, the target of the analysis is operating correctly. 
Mathematically a RBD is similar to a fault tree. It represents the logical function linking 
the states of the individual components (failed or working) to the state of the whole 
system (failed or working). Therefore the calculations are similar as those described for 
fault trees. 













Figure 13  Example of a RBD 
 
References: 
 IEC 61078:2006, Analysis techniques for dependability - Reliability block 
diagram and boolean methods 
 Sécurisation des architectures informatiques. Jean-Louis Boulanger, Hermbs - 
Lavoisier, 2009  
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5.2. Follow up of RAM Critical Items 
As of the detailed design phases, and in order to follow up, control and solve/mitigate any 
kind of issue affecting RAM performance, the following tasks will be performed by the 
LRT contractors and suppliers:  
 Identify, as part of the RAM analysis process, critical scenarios affecting Service 
Availability. 
 Classify these scenarios in a hierarchy based on the combination of their 
estimated frequency of occurrence and their effects on Service Availability (SA). 
 Estimate the impact of proposed actions. 
 Follow up application of these actions during the design and manufacturing 
phase. 
The action plan shall define and specify requirements, procedures and recommendations 
about the design, construction and O&M, in order to reach or improve the RAM 
requirements. 
The follow up of RAM critical items shall be carried out by LRT Contractors and is 
therefore out of the scope of this study 
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6. LRT RAM Analysis and Prediction 
6.1. Decision on the chosen methods 
Two of the methods mentioned before that this study adopts are FMECA and FTA. For 
Fault Tree Analyses, Item Toolkit
5
 software will be used. This decision comes from the 
fact that these two methods are the most extended and representative in RAM studies, 
although any of others would be also correct to use and the result will be the same.  
6.2. Critical System Selection 
The critical system selection determines the scope of the analysis. Only electro-
mechanical / electrical / electronic systems, that are essential to meet the Service 
Availability, and that are not designed according to an international standard for structural 
components, are included in the RAM analysis. In addition, the decision of whether a 
system can affect or not the SA is given by Engineering Judgement from discipline 
experts. 
6.2.1. Effect on Key Performance Indicators 
Table 6 overleaf shows the results of a preliminary identification of the LRT systems that 
could affect each of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): 
 red cells indicate that a subsystem failure would affect a SA PI,  
 green cells indicate that a subsystem failure cannot affect a SA PI,  
It is noted that a failure of a subsystem could affect more than one Performance Indicator, 
although probably with different failure modes (see section 6.3). For instance, a failure in 
the rolling stock that provokes a delay in the departure time may be different from a 
failure in the rolling stock affecting the commercial speed.  
Nevertheless, this section provides a preliminary analysis of what systems could have an 
impact on Service Availability, and is aimed solely at that identifying whether or not the 
subsystem shall be included in the FTA (section 6.5).  
A more accurate analysis is presented in the failure modes analysis shown in section 6.3, 
where the specific subsystem functions’ failures that degrade the overall Service 
Availability will be analysed. 
 
                                               
5
 http://www.itemsoft.com/item_toolkit.html 
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LRT CRITICAL SYSTEM SELECTION 
Rail Systems 













Power defect can 
delay/prevent trip 
start 
Power defect can 
reduce Commercial 
Speed 
Power defect can 
result in Train 
Evacuation 




Comms defect can 
delay/prevent trip 
start 
Comms defect can 
reduce Commercial 
Speed 
Comms defect can 
result in Train 
Evacuation 




Rolling Stock defect 
can delay/prevent trip 
start 
Rolling Stock defect 
can reduce 
Commercial Speed 
Rolling Stock defect 
can result in Train 
Evacuation 
Rolling Stock defect 
can result in 
Unscheduled Stops 
OCC 
OCC defect cannot 
delay/prevent trip 
start 
OCC defect cannot 
reduce Commercial 
Speed 
OCC defect cannot 
result in Train 
Evacuation 




MEP defect cannot 
delay/prevent trip 
start 
MEP cannot reduce 
Commercial Speed 
MEP defect cannot 
result in Train 
Evacuation 











can result in Train 
Evacuation 
Signalling defect 
can result in 
Unscheduled Stops 
AFC 
AFC defect can 
delay/prevent trip 
start 
AFC defect cannot 
reduce Commercial 
Speed 
AFC defect cannot 
result in Train 
Evacuation 
AFC defect cannot 
result in 
Unscheduled Stops 
Fire & Life 
Safety 
Fire & Life Safety 
can delay/prevent trip 
start 
Fire & Life Safety 
defect can reduce 
Commercial Speed 
Fire & Life Safety 
defect cannot result 
in Train Evacuation 
Fire & Life Safety 











can result in Train 
Evacuation 
Guideway defect 
can result in 
Unscheduled Stops 
Table 6 LRT critical system selection 
 
Table 6 shows the selection of the critical LRT systems for the purposes of the reliability 
and availability starts with development of a list of subsystems which comprise the entire 
LRT system (refer System Breakdown Structure, in 3.5.1). The system selection method 
described in section 4.3.1 and presented in Figure 7 has been applied to selection of 
systems to be analysed in this analysis and prediction report. 
Only systems with category output 4 (see Figure 8) are included in the analysis. 
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6.3. Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
A preliminary Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) has been carried 
out for the LRT System described in section 3.1. The purpose of this FMECA is to 
analyse the possible effects of each failure on the System, from the point of view of the 
Operation, Maintenance, and the following Key Performance Indicators (see section 4.2): 
 PIDT: Departure Times 
 PICS: Commercial Speed 
 PITE: Train Evacuations 
 PIUS: Unscheduled Stops 
The objective is to determine the Reliability, Availability and Maintainability critical 
functions and determine the applicable requirements for each sub-system. 
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Incomers feed energy 
from the electrical 
company through 
redundant feeder taps. 
POW01 
Loss of one of the Main Power Supply incoming feeders. 
 
Rationale: It affects only departure times, while redundant 
incomer feeder taps and redundant transformers reconfigure. 
Neither commercial speed nor evacuation or unscheduled stops are 
affected by this failure because the reconfiguration takes few 
seconds.   
Yes No No No 500000 2 
Transformation of Input 
Voltage (>35kV) to 
internal MV distribution 
Voltage (2-35kV) 
POW02 
Failure of one transformer or related protection. 
 
Rationale: Detection of a fault on the Transformer-Rectifier results 
in its isolation and, for this reason, a loss of feeding to a section of 
the catenary. It affects only departure times, while redundant 
system automatically reconfigures in a few seconds. 





energy (MV) to all 
Traction Power 
Substations along the 
route. 
POW03 
Failure of the distribution of MV to Traction Power Substations. 
 
Rationale: This failure could prevent a tram departing from a Stop, 
or diminish commercial speed, as a result of the momentary power 
interruption.  
It does not affect the evacuation because it would be able to re-start 
operation after system restoration thanks to the redundant MV 
substation system.  
As it is a momentary power interruption, it does not cause an 
unscheduled stop. 




Group transforms AC 
MV distribution voltage 
to DC traction voltage 
POW04 
Failure of one Transformer/Rectifier Group 
 
Rationale:  T/R failure could prevent a tram departing from a Stop 
or result in a diminished commercial speed. In addition, the time 
needed to investigate the cause of the fault may necessitate train 
evacuation. 
Yes Yes Yes No 500000 4 
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increase the total OHL 
cross section 
POW05 
Loss one of the Traction Power incoming feeders. 
 
Rationale: Loss one of the Traction Power incoming feeders may 
limit the power which can be extracted from the catenary and hence 
affect propulsion equipment performance (commercial speed). So, 
departure times will be also affected by this failure.  




The OCS allows 
transmission of 
electrical power to 





Rationale: The detection of a fault on the OCS and its isolation 
means that the affected OCS cannot be connected to the substations 
until the cause of the fault has been "cleared".  In addition to 
preventing a tram from departing from a station or causing an 
unscheduled stop between stations, the time needed to investigate 
the cause of the fault may necessitate train evacuation. It might also 
prevent the operation of trains and affect commercial speed for 
trains running between stops. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 500000 4 
OCS segmentation 




OCS segment failure 
 
Rationale: The detection of a fault on an OCS segment and its 
isolation means that the affected OCS section cannot be connected 
to the adjacent OCS sections until the cause of the fault has been 
"cleared". This may prevent a train from departing from a Stop. In 
addition, the time needed to investigate the cause of the fault may 
necessitate train evacuation.  
Yes No Yes No 500000 4 
OCS segments 
connected by Switching 
Posts along the route 
POW08 
Loss of energy at one OCS segment 
Rationale: The lack of energy at the affected segment will prevent 
a train from departing from a Stop and additionally, an unscheduled 
stop until the energy supply is recovered.  
Yes No No Yes 500000 4 
OCS is supported by 
poles 
POW09 
OCS pole failure 
 
Rationale: This failure implies to stop the tram circulation while 
the pole is affected; hence it takes place a train evacuation (i.e. the 
pole falls in the LRT right of way) and, consequently, departure 
times will be affected.  
Yes No Yes No 500000 4 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 






















Minimize the leakage of 
stray currents 
POW10 
Damage for galvanic corrosion of water or gas pipe under the track 
originates leak. 
 
Rationale: This failure may provoke the signalling system 
malfunction, and as a consequence departure times, train 
evacuations and unscheduled stops are affected. 
Yes No Yes Yes 648000 8 
POW11 
Dangerous step and/or touch potentials.  
Rationale: The effects of stray current can create dangerous step 
and/or touch potentials which could result in service delay due to 
passenger injury.  
















communications in all 
system's areas (tram, 
station, tracks, depot 
/OCC, etc.) 
COM01 
Failure in information transmission. 
Unable to establish communication between 2 or more system's 
areas. 
 
Rationale: Service delayed. Unable to coordinate traffic. 
Yes No No No 100000 1 
COM02 
Wrong information transmission. 
Wrong information give it between 2 or more system's areas. 
 
Rationale: Service delayed. Bad traffic coordinator. 





Unable to manage communication information. 
Communication operator cannot access to the information. 
 
Rationale: Service delayed. Unable to coordinate all traffic trams. 
Yes No No No 100000 1 
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To transmit data among 
the network 
COM04 
Loss of signalling communication. 
 
Rationale: Driver should use degraded mode without signalling 
communications. Driver should communicate with OCC and 
receive orders (unscheduled stop). The operation of all trains 
without signalling will mean departures delay and commercial 
speed impact. 
Yes Yes No Yes 100000 1 
Transmit data among 
the OCC, depot, 




Unable data transmission among all systems. 
 
Rationale: Service interrupted. All communications system failed. 
Difficult to repair. Evacuation of the train, due to long time to 
repair. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 500000 5 
COM06 
Loss of data integrity. 
Wrong data transmission among all systems. 
 
Rationale: Service interrupted. Wrong instructions transmission, 
but it does not mean that the tram has to be evacuated.   
Yes Yes No Yes 100000 1 
Radio 
Communications 
Provide multi personal 
communication 




Radio Controller failure. 
 
Rationale: Service interrupted. Impossible to communicate with 
the driver. Evacuation of the train, due to long time to repair. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 100000 4 
COM08 
Radio Base Station failure (zone affected)  
 
Rationale: Service interrupted. Impossible to communicate with 
the driver. Evacuation of the train, due to long time to repair. 




between individuals or 
from point to point) 
COM09 
Train selective radio communication failure. 
 
Rationale: Operational procedure: to inform when train arrives at 
stop. Use a handset terminal.  
Yes No No No 30000 0.5 
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Video monitoring at 
stops, depots, tram 
wayside and on-board 
COM10 
Loss of video monitoring at road crossings. 
 
Rationale: Slight decrease of speed at road crossings without 
CCTV. 












To allow passengers to 
board and alight the 
tram. 
RST01 
Defect in the door movement which delays or prevents passengers 
boarding or alighting the tram. 
 
Rationale: An LRT door temporarily not closing properly at a stop 
may require that the driver:  
1. Notices the problem  
2. Identifies where the problem is  
3. Tries to mitigate it (probably trying to open all doors, and then 
closing again).  
4. Resume the trip. 
This may provoke a delay in the departure times. 
Yes No No No 23000 0.15 
To ensure passengers 
alight where and when 
it is safe to. 
RST02 
Door opens whilst tram is moving. 
 
Rationale: This failure will activate the door interlock resulting in 
the initiation of an emergency brake application (unscheduled stop) 
affecting the average commercial speed and departure time of the 
following trams.  
Yes Yes No Yes 23000 0.25 
To allow passengers to 
move along the interior 
of the entire tram. 
RST03 
Loss of mechanical integrity.  
 
Rationale: May result in a partially fall of its components.  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 750000 1 
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Loss of mechanical integrity or electrical continuity. 
 
Rationale: May result in an emergency brake application 
(unscheduled stop) or prevent a brake application from being 
released (i.e. Affects Departures Time). As a result, commercial 
speed can be affected and evacuation of train may be done.  





To limit train movement 
damaging the track 
RST05 
Fails to limit train movement from damaging track. 
 
Rationale: The tram is operated at reduce speed (reduced 
Commercial Speed) until it can be removed from service. The 
following trams may experience delays on departure times. 
Yes Yes No No 230000 0.7 
To provide a 
comfortable ride for 
passengers 
RST06 
The tram gives a poor ride comfort.  
 
Rationale: The tram is operated at reduce speed (reduced 
Commercial Speed) until it can be removed from service. The 
following trams may experience delays on departure times. 
Yes Yes No No 230000 0.7 
Propulsion 
System 






Rationale: A degradation of the rate of acceleration and/or 
maximum speed may reduce commercial speed. The following 
trams may experience delays on departure times. 
Yes Yes No No 90000 8 
RST08 
Propulsion system failure. 
 
Rationale: Failure results in train stopping between stops 
(Unscheduled Stop). If the failure occurs at a Stop, it may also 
affect departure times, and reduce commercial speed.  
Yes Yes No Yes 90000 8 
Brakes 
To provide speed in 
order to ensure that a 
tram can be stopped 
properly. 
RST09 
Reduction or loss of brake effectiveness. 
 
Rationale: This failure will result in an emergency brake 
application by the driver or the ATP system. 
Yes Yes No Yes 46000 0.9 
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Train control network 
shall connect all the 
train equipment. 
RST10 
Loss of communication between the train equipment (traction, 
brake, on-board signalling equipment, etc.). 
 
Rationale: It may affect commercial speed (traction 
communication failure), departure times and may provoke 
unscheduled stops (if emergency brake is activated). 




Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) used to convert 
power from the catenary 
into supplies required 
for the operation of 
auxiliary systems 
RST11 
Failure to supply auxiliary systems. Loss of Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning (HVAC) functionality. Batteries provide 
emergency lighting and enables doors to continue to operate.  
Rationale: If batteries fail, doors will not operate; hence a train 
evacuation will take place. 
No No Yes No 50000 3 
Power collector allows 
electrical energy to be 
drawn from catenary 
power to supply the 
electrical system on the 
vehicle. 
RST12 
Loss of pantograph. 
 
Rationale: Loss of pantograph may result in inability to move 
away from a location where it has stopped (in a stop or between 
stops). This results in a Train Evacuation. 
No No Yes No 90000 0.45 
General 
Rolling Stock failure 
requiring technician to 
recover the tram 
RST13 
Exceptional failure in which it is impossible to continue the service 
without the assistance of a technician to recover the failed tram.  
Rationale: Train evacuation will take place in this situation, in 
addition to the affectation of unscheduled stops due to that 
exceptional failure.  











Failure of one or more HVAC units requires passengers to be 
detrained and the train taken out of service due the challenging 
climate conditions 
 
Rationale: HVAC failure provokes that compartment temperature 
exceeds the specified comfort values; hence it affects the Train 
Evacuation.  
No No Yes No 100000 1 
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Fire Detection and 
Alarm 
RST15 
Failure of vehicle Fire and Life Safety (F&LS) system gives a false 
fire alarm. 
 
Rationale: Activation of a fire alarm will cause the driver to stop 
the tram, therefore affecting PIUS, and probably evacuate the tram 
therefore affecting PITE.  


























Traffic Operator OCC01 
Incorrect Operation or Sabotage. 
 
Rationale: Even though this failure would impact on any of the 
four performance indicators, this event is out of the scope of RAM 
analyses (See section 3.3 - Human error/Sabotage) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 26280 0.25 
Building OCC Building OCC02 
Damage resulting from terrorism or other deliberate external factor. 
 
Rationale: Even though this failure would impact on any of the 
four performance indicators, this event is out of the scope of RAM 
analyses (See section 3.3) 










Detect and provide tram 
position 
SIG01 
Unable to detect trains due to a failure on a tram detection device 
(Wayside Axle counters).  
 
Rationale: Unable to set routes for a line section requiring the 
suspension of services on the affected line section. This failure can 
result in unscheduled stops. Suspension of services on a line 
section will impact on departure times with the affected section. 
Yes No No Yes 500000 2 
SIG02 
Unable to detect switch position. 
 
Rationale: Unable to detect switch position which will need the 
driver or other agent actuation (affecting commercial speed). 
No Yes No No 500000 2 
SIG03 
Train detected in a track section where there is no LRT. 
Rationale: This failure will provoke that trams will not be allowed 
to depart from a Stop; hence it will affect departure times. 
Yes No No No 500000 2 
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Protect system against 
incompatible routes 
SIG04 
Unable to switch point machine (failure of interlocking).  
 
Rationale: This failure will result in a train evacuation. Inability to 
remotely operate switch machines may affect commercial speed. 




Failure of the interlocking. 
 
Rationale: This failure will result in an unscheduled stop and 
hence a possible LRT evacuation if it cannot be repaired.  
No No Yes Yes 500000 2 
SIG06 
Permissive aspect is displayed. Trains have permissive when they 
should not. (Failure of interlocking). 
Rationale: Signal passed at danger may provoke collisions and 
hence train evacuations. 




Non permissive aspect is displayed. Trains do not have permissive 
when they should. (Failure of interlocking) 
 
Rationale: Trains may be stuck on Stops affecting departure times. 
It may also provoke an unscheduled stop, due to a non-permissive 
aspect of a wayside signal. 
Yes No No Yes 500000 2 
SIG08 
Proceed aspect is displayed. Trains have permissive when they 
should not (Failure of a signal)  
 
Rationale: Unnoticed signal passed at danger may lead to a 
collision with a subsequent train evacuation. Commercial speed 
may also be affected. 
No Yes Yes No 500000 2 
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Manage Point Machines 
(Switches) 
SIG09 
Incorrect point machine position monitoring. Uncontrolled routes 
of LRT. 
 
Rationale: Inability to remotely operate switch machines may 
affect Train Departures. Inability to detect wayside equipment may 
affect Commercial Speed. 
Yes Yes No No 500000 2 
SIG10 
Position of point machine is not controlled. LRT moves to an 
incorrect track section 
 
Rationale: Inability to remotely operate switch machines may 
affect Train Departures. Inability to detect wayside equipment may 
affect Commercial Speed. 
Yes Yes No No 500000 2 
SIG11 
Possible LRT movement to an incorrect track section. 
 
Rationale: This failure may prevent trains from departing from 
Stop, therefore affecting departure times. Inability to detect 
wayside equipment may affect Commercial Speed. 






Manual operation of interlocking is not available. System 
inoperative. 
Rationale: As the system is inoperative, the driver will have to run 
on sight until the next stop. That means that the commercial speed 
would be diminished and that will provoke a delay on next 
departure times.  
Yes Yes No No 15000 1 
SIG13 
Proceed command is sent both for road vehicles and for LRT. LRT 
during normal operation and road vehicles move to an intersection. 
Rationale: This failure provokes a reduction of commercial speed 
due to the degraded mode operation and hence, a delay on the 
departure times. The tram does not stop at all, so it does not 
generate an unscheduled stop.  
Yes Yes No No 15000 1 
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Stop command sent to LRT. LRT must stop at intersection. 
Rationale: This command has to be respected by the driver, who 
will stop the tram until next orders; hence it also affects departure 
times for next trams.  
Yes No No Yes 15000 1 
Coordinate Road traffic 
lights 
SIG15 
Permissive aspect is displayed. Road vehicles/pedestrians have 
permissive when they should not. (Failure of traffic regulator). 
Rationale: This failure provokes a reduction of commercial speed 
due to a potential collision and hence, a delay on the departure 
times. The tram does not stop at all, so it does not generate an 
unscheduled stop. 
Yes Yes No No 15000 1 
SIG16 
Non permissive aspect is displayed. Road vehicles/pedestrians do 
not have permissive when they should. (Failure of traffic 
regulator). 
Rationale: Although it does not affect directly to tram, a potential 
collision will appear if vehicles/pedestrian do not respect its road 
traffic lights due to the failure of the traffic regulator. Hence, tram 
speed would be diminished and departures times affected.  




























Failure of one validator machine (either check-in or check-out). 
Passengers need to use an alternative validator. 
Rationale: Departure times will be affected if passengers cannot 
validate tickets and have to wait for another machine to validate it.  
Yes No No No 100000 1 
AFC02 
Failure of all validators or the concentrator (either check-in or 
check-out). Passengers cannot validate their tickets. 
Rationale: Departure times will be affected if passengers cannot 
validate their tickets. 
Yes No No No 130000 1 
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Extinguish the fire 
FLS01 
Fire extinguisher system fails to extinguish fire in substations or 
technical rooms. 
 
Rationale: If a substation fails as a consequence of fire, it may 
affect the power fed into the catenary, and hence the commercial 
speed may be affected. 
No Yes No No 10000 1 
FLS02 
Fire extinguisher system fails to extinguish fire in stops. 
 
Rationale: A fire in a Stop may affect departure times, as the Stop 
could be closed to passengers, or passengers may be 
distracted/panic by the fire and difficult the boarding/alighting. 










support and guidance to 
the vehicle 
TRK01 
Manufacturing defects or defective mounting of rails. 
 
Rationale: These defects will wear and tear due to cycling loading, 
which may affect commercial speed. 
No Yes No No 2,08·106 1.5 
TRK02 
Fracture in rail due to fatigue and stress cracking. 
 
Rationale: This may have an effect on any of the four KPIs, as 
failure in the rail has a direct impact on all aspects of service. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 236000 4 
TRK03 
Resonance and excessive rail stresses 
 
Rationale: Resonance and excessive rail stresses due to rail 
corrugation on the running surface of the rail may lead to a reduced 
commercial speed. 
No Yes No No 2,08·106 1.5 
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To fasten the rail to the 
track structure 
TRK04 
Fasteners inadequately fixed during construction or maintenance.  
 
Rationale: This wear and tear on rails affecting by slight vertical 
and horizontal movements of rails, therefore affecting commercial 
speed. 
No Yes No No 2,08·106 0.15 
Gauge 
Track gauge allows the 
vehicle to be operated 
on the track. 
TRK05 
Failure in track gauge due to defective mounting and 
implementation. 
 
Rationale: May affect commercial speed due to excessive forces 
on wheels, bogies. 
No Yes No No 1,52·106 1.5 
 
Table 7 Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for LRT System 
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6.4. Sensitive Analysis on Key Performance Indicators 
The Service Availability is defined as a series (i.e. multiplication) of several factors or 
Key Performance Indicators, so that a variation in a single Key Performance Indicator 
provokes the Service Availability to decrease (see section 4.2). The required SA is 
99.8%; consequently if a single Key Performance Indicator is reduced by more than 
0.2%, the system will fail to meet the required SA. 
It must be noted however, that the SA is obtained by multiplying not binary factors (i.e. 
Key Performance Indicators are not binary). This provokes that, without the proper 
justification, the SA cannot be modelled using reliability modelling tools usually used in 
reliability analysis (e.g. FTA) since these can only be used to model binary events
6
. 
Giving the proper justification for this is therefore of prime importance in order to permit 
and underpin the use of FTAs in this report. 
The purpose of this section is hence twofold;  
 firstly, to study how many and what type of failures provoke that the KPIs 
decrease by the aforementioned 0.2%, and 
 secondly, and more importantly, to demonstrate that the event “failure to meet 
99.8%” for each Key Performance Indicator can be considered (i.e. safely 
approximated by) a binary event
7
 (i.e. any failure makes the Key Performance 
Indicators go below the 99.8% barrier). 
In light of the above discussion, the impact of each Key Performance Indicators on the 
Trip Achievement Level is analysed in the following sections. 
  
                                               
6
 It can be demonstrated by how Availability is usually measured: A = MUT / (MDT+ MUT), see 
for instance [15]. That is, we need to measure, at a specific instant of time, whether the system is 
either 100% Up (MUT) or 100% Down (MDT). It is not correct (and could not be taken into 
account in the above formula) to have the system 80% Up (or, alternatively, 20% Down), which is 
otherwise allowed by the definition of SA (for instance in the case of all factors in TAL equal to 1, 
except IPCS, being, for example, 0.9 - 90% of the scheduled commercial speed). Then the system 
would be "90% Up". 
7
 Following from the previous example, if very small variations of the commercial speed (e.g. 1 
km/h) brings the SA below the required 99.8% we may safely approximate it as a binary event (i.e. 
“any” failure to meet the commercial speed affects the service availability) and therefore the use of 
FTAs would be allowed. This rationale also holds for the other Performance Indicators. 
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6.4.1.    Impact of PIDT on the Service Availability 
PIDT has been defined in section 4.2.1 as: 
     
        
        
   (9)  
 
for the first scheduled trip of the operating day, and 
     
        
        
   (10)  
 
for the rest of scheduled trips, where: 
     is the departure time of the considered scheduled trip. 
      is the departure time of the previous scheduled trip. 
      is the departure time of the next scheduled trip. 
     is the departure time of the actual trip that is linked to the considered 
scheduled trip. 
      is the departure time of the actual trip that departed before the actual trip 
that is linked to the considered scheduled trip. 
Assuming that the previous actual trip departed on time (i.e.          ), the 
Performance Indicator can be approximated by (see Figure 14): 
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This is shown graphically in Figure 14: 
 
 
Figure 14  Departure times for scheduled trips 
 
Taking into account that during peak periods
8
, the headway shall not exceed 3 minutes 
(worst case), and during off-peak periods, the headway shall not exceed 6 minutes in the 
worst case (see 0), the effect of the delay on the quality factor, and hence on the overall 
Service Availability can be calculated. Additionally, the LRT lines shall be capable of 
operating shorter headways of 2 minutes. Both tables have been created to present typical 
LRT headways for this Study. 
 
Table 8 LRT headways (in minutes) for L1 and L2 
 
The effect of the several headways on the Performance Indicator of Departure Times is 
shown in Figure 15. 
                                               
8
 The morning peak period starts at 7:00 and ends at 10:00. The evening peak period starts at 14:00 













LRT HEADWAYS – WINTER (units are minutes) 
Hour Labour day Friday Saturday 
5 to 6 9 15 9 
6 to 7 6 10 6 
7 to 10 3 6 5 
10 to 14 8 6 8 
14 to 19 3 6 5 
19 to 00  8 10 8 
   
Peak hours 
LRT HEADWAYS – SUMMER (units are minutes) 
Hour Labour day Friday Saturday 
5 to 6 9 15 9 
6 to 7 6 10 6 
7 to 10 3 7 5 
10 to 14 8 7 8 
14 to 19 3 7 5 
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Figure 15   Impact of the PIDT on the Trip Achievement Level 
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Figure 15 shows that the effect of a delay in the departure time is much more important 
with a reduced headway, as it is used in the formula as a reference to measure relative 
deviation. The first scheduled trip of the day is the least affected by a delay.  
To put this in context, it must be calculated the amount of delay necessary such that the 
Performance Indicator is reduced by 0.2%: 
 PIDT = 99.8%  Delay = 1.08 seconds (off-peak hours, 9 minutes headway) 
 PIDT = 99.8%  Delay = 0.72 seconds (off-peak hours, 6 minutes headway) 
 PIDT = 99.8%  Delay = 0.36 seconds (peak hours, 3 minutes headway) 
 PIDT = 99.8%  Delay = 0.24 seconds (peak hours, 2 minutes headway) 
In summary, it can be safely stated that any practical delay in the departure time brings 
the Service Availability below the required 99.8% level. 
With these conditions it can be stated that, for instance, if the service had a common 
delay of 5 minutes, the service would suffer a big decrease on the SA due to the reduction 
of the PIDT contribution. 
Using equation (12), the Performance Indicator for Departure Times would become: 
 Delay = 5 minutes  PIDT = 44.4% (off-peak hours, 9 minutes headway) 
 Delay = 5 minutes  PIDT = 54.5% (off-peak hours, 6 minutes headway) 
 Delay = 5 minutes  PIDT = 37.5% (peak hours, 3 minutes headway) 
 Delay = 5 minutes  PIDT = 28.6% (peak hours, 2 minutes headway) 
These PIDT values demonstrate that even if the SA was, for instance, 99%, the service 
availability would be highly lower due to the delay on the departure. Appendix V: Impact 




                                               
9
 It is a double entry table. At the top there are the tens, which shall be selected in order to have its 
contribution with the corresponding unit value (leftmost column) for each cell. 
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6.4.2.    Impact of PICS on the Service Availability 
PICS has been defined in section 4.2.2 as 
            
                       
                          
   
                
                       
                          
 
  (13)  
 
The measurement period is from the close door command at the first scheduled stop until 
the door open command at the last scheduled stop. 
Actual commercial speed is the average speed of the LRT. It can be shown that: 
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where   is the number of stops of the line,    is the interval length between stations     
and   ,    is the average speed between stations     and  , and     is the dwell time at 
station    . For the sake of simplicity it can be assumed an average speed equal for all 
intervals (          ), and a dwell time equal for all stations (            ), the 
actual commercial speed can be approximated by: 
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  (16)  
 
     is a value that needs to be calculated. The commercial speed for the whole trip has 
been set at least 20 km/h for L1 and L2, as it is a typical value for LRT Systems.   
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Using equation (16) it is possible to calculate the necessary      between stations for 
each of the 2 lines. This is shown in Table 9, where dwell times have been calculated for 
the two lines (proposed in section 3.1) L1 and L2
10
: 
Line CS (km/h) N Length (km) DTavg (sec.) Savg (km/h) 
1 20 24 15,12 20,8 24.0 
2 20 21 11,80 21,4 24.7 
Table 9 Average speed between LRT stops for L1 and L2 lines 
Using equation (13) it is possible to calculate the effect (on the PICS for a specific line) 
of a reduction of the Actual Commercial Speed in each interval. This is shown in Figure 1 
and Figure 17. Numerical values are provided in Table 10 and Table 11. 
It must be noted that this Key Performance Indicator is dependent on the number of 
stations per line, and hence, will vary for L1 and L2 lines. Figure 1 and Figure 17 show 
that a decrease in the actual speed in the shorter intervals has less impact on the overall 
Service Availability as compared to longer intervals, where a decrease in the average 
speed has much more noticeable effect on the actual speed for the whole trip. 
Also, the fewer number of stations a line has, the more it is affected by a decrease of the 
commercial speed. In general (except by the shorter intervals), it is apparent that in a 
majority of cases a decrease of just a few km/h in a specific interval (e.g. 1 to 2 km/h), 
affects the PICS by more than 0.2%, hence being unable to meet the required Service 
Availability of 99.8%. 
Having a reduction of 1 or 2 km/h in the actual average speed between stops can therefore 
be safely considered as a binary event (i.e. any failure that provoke a decrease of the 
commercial speed, will make the system unable to reach the required SA). 
 
 
                                               
10
 20 sec. in regular stops and 30 sec. in stops with intermodal connectivity. 
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Figure 16  Impact of the PICS on the TAL of LRT L1 – with Gnuplot software 
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Performance Indicator for Commercial Speed (PICS) (LRT L1) 
   
Decrease in the Commercial Speed (-ΔCS) (km/h) 
Stop St-to-St (m) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 SL1001 120,0 1,0000 0,9997 0,9994 0,9991 0,9987 0,9983 0,9978 0,9973 0,9967 0,9961 
2 SL1002 1240,0 1,0000 0,9970 0,9938 0,9904 0,9866 0,9824 0,9778 0,9727 0,9671 0,9608 
3 SL1003 792,0 1,0000 0,9981 0,9961 0,9938 0,9914 0,9887 0,9857 0,9824 0,9787 0,9746 
4 SL1004 689,5 1,0000 0,9984 0,9966 0,9946 0,9925 0,9901 0,9875 0,9847 0,9814 0,9778 
5 SL1005 660,5 1,0000 0,9984 0,9967 0,9948 0,9928 0,9905 0,9881 0,9853 0,9822 0,9787 
6 SL1006 615,0 1,0000 0,9985 0,9969 0,9952 0,9933 0,9912 0,9889 0,9863 0,9834 0,9802 
7 SL1007 470,7 1,0000 0,9989 0,9977 0,9963 0,9949 0,9932 0,9915 0,9895 0,9872 0,9847 
8 SL1008 555,2 1,0000 0,9987 0,9972 0,9957 0,9939 0,9920 0,9899 0,9876 0,9850 0,9820 
9 SL1009 514,9 1,0000 0,9988 0,9974 0,9960 0,9944 0,9926 0,9907 0,9885 0,9861 0,9833 
10 SL1010 678,4 1,0000 0,9984 0,9966 0,9947 0,9926 0,9903 0,9877 0,9849 0,9817 0,9782 
11 SL1011 558,7 1,0000 0,9987 0,9972 0,9956 0,9939 0,9920 0,9899 0,9875 0,9849 0,9819 
12 SL1012 636,9 1,0000 0,9985 0,9968 0,9950 0,9931 0,9909 0,9885 0,9858 0,9828 0,9795 
13 SL1013 480,3 1,0000 0,9989 0,9976 0,9962 0,9948 0,9931 0,9913 0,9893 0,9870 0,9844 
14 SL1014 574,6 1,0000 0,9986 0,9971 0,9955 0,9937 0,9918 0,9896 0,9872 0,9845 0,9814 
15 SL1015 392,5 1,0000 0,9991 0,9980 0,9969 0,9957 0,9944 0,9929 0,9912 0,9893 0,9872 
16 SL1016 1484,0 1,0000 0,9965 0,9926 0,9885 0,9840 0,9790 0,9736 0,9675 0,9609 0,9534 
17 SL1017 564,0 1,0000 0,9987 0,9972 0,9956 0,9938 0,9919 0,9898 0,9874 0,9848 0,9818 
18 SL1018 458,0 1,0000 0,9989 0,9977 0,9964 0,9950 0,9934 0,9917 0,9898 0,9876 0,9851 
19 SL1019 434,8 1,0000 0,9990 0,9978 0,9966 0,9952 0,9938 0,9921 0,9903 0,9882 0,9859 
20 SL1020 451,2 1,0000 0,9989 0,9978 0,9965 0,9951 0,9935 0,9918 0,9899 0,9878 0,9854 
21 SL1021 699,9 1,0000 0,9983 0,9965 0,9945 0,9924 0,9900 0,9874 0,9844 0,9812 0,9775 
22 SL1022 504,1 1,0000 0,9988 0,9975 0,9961 0,9945 0,9928 0,9909 0,9887 0,9864 0,9837 
23 SL1023 718,0 1,0000 0,9983 0,9964 0,9944 0,9922 0,9897 0,9870 0,9840 0,9807 0,9769 
24 SL1024 822,0 1,0000 0,9980 0,9959 0,9936 0,9911 0,9883 0,9852 0,9818 0,9779 0,9737 
Table 10 Impact of the PICS on the TAL of LRT L1 (Numerical) 
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Figure 17  Impact of the PICS on the TAL of LRT L2 – with Gnuplot software 
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Performance Indicator for Commercial Speed (PICS) (LRT L2) 
   
Decrease in the Commercial Speed (-ΔCS) (km/h) 
Station St-to-St (m) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 SL2001 282,0 1,0000 0,9992 0,9983 0,9973 0,9963 0,9951 0,9938 0,9924 0,9908 0,9891 
2 SL2002 493,5 1,0000 0,9986 0,9970 0,9954 0,9935 0,9915 0,9893 0,9868 0,9841 0,9810 
3 SL2003 566,4 1,0000 0,9984 0,9966 0,9947 0,9926 0,9903 0,9877 0,9849 0,9818 0,9783 
4 SL2004 473,8 1,0000 0,9986 0,9972 0,9955 0,9938 0,9918 0,9897 0,9873 0,9847 0,9818 
5 SL2005 425,4 1,0000 0,9988 0,9974 0,9960 0,9944 0,9927 0,9908 0,9886 0,9863 0,9836 
6 SL2006 647,6 1,0000 0,9981 0,9961 0,9939 0,9915 0,9889 0,9860 0,9828 0,9792 0,9752 
7 SL2007 526,6 1,0000 0,9985 0,9968 0,9950 0,9931 0,9909 0,9886 0,9860 0,9830 0,9798 
8 SL2008 443,0 1,0000 0,9987 0,9973 0,9958 0,9942 0,9924 0,9904 0,9882 0,9857 0,9829 
9 SL2009 447,0 1,0000 0,9987 0,9973 0,9958 0,9941 0,9923 0,9903 0,9881 0,9856 0,9828 
10 SL2010 560,0 1,0000 0,9984 0,9966 0,9947 0,9927 0,9904 0,9879 0,9851 0,9820 0,9785 
11 SL2011 511,1 1,0000 0,9985 0,9969 0,9952 0,9933 0,9912 0,9889 0,9864 0,9835 0,9804 
12 SL2012 663,6 1,0000 0,9981 0,9960 0,9938 0,9913 0,9886 0,9856 0,9824 0,9787 0,9747 
13 SL2013 475,7 1,0000 0,9986 0,9971 0,9955 0,9938 0,9918 0,9897 0,9873 0,9847 0,9817 
14 SL2014 356,0 1,0000 0,9990 0,9979 0,9966 0,9953 0,9939 0,9922 0,9905 0,9885 0,9862 
15 SL2015 472,0 1,0000 0,9986 0,9972 0,9956 0,9938 0,9919 0,9897 0,9874 0,9848 0,9818 
16 SL2016 431,0 1,0000 0,9988 0,9974 0,9959 0,9943 0,9926 0,9906 0,9885 0,9861 0,9834 
17 SL2017 405,3 1,0000 0,9988 0,9976 0,9962 0,9947 0,9930 0,9912 0,9892 0,9869 0,9844 
18 SL2018 586,7 1,0000 0,9983 0,9965 0,9945 0,9923 0,9899 0,9873 0,9844 0,9811 0,9775 
19 SL2019 624,7 1,0000 0,9982 0,9962 0,9941 0,9918 0,9893 0,9865 0,9834 0,9799 0,9761 
20 SL2020 767,3 1,0000 0,9978 0,9954 0,9928 0,9900 0,9869 0,9834 0,9797 0,9755 0,9708 
21 SL2021 1641,0 1,0000 0,9953 0,9902 0,9847 0,9788 0,9723 0,9652 0,9575 0,9490 0,9396 
Table 11 Impact of the PICS on the TAL of LRT L2 (Numerical)
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6.4.3.    Impact of PITE on the Service Availability 
PITE is a binary quality criterion (if the train is evacuated between two stations during the 
trip, then          for the considered trip). No further analysis is needed to evaluate 
the impact of the PITE on the overall service availability. 
 
6.4.4.    Impact of PIUS on the Service Availability 
PIUS has been defined in section 4.2.4 as: 
                         (17)  
Where: 
     is the number of unscheduled stops per trip. 
     is the number of emergency stops per trip. 
The impact of the PIUS on the Trip Achievement Level is shown in Table 12 and Figure 
18. This Key Performance Indicator is independent of the number of stops, and hence 
independent of the Line. 
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Figure 18  Impact of the PIUS on the Trip Achievement Level 
 
Unscheduled Stops (PIUS) 
  
Number of unscheduled stops per trip (NUS) 
  






0 1,00 0,90 0,80 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 
1 0,80 0,70 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0,00 0,00 
2 0,60 0,50 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
3 0,40 0,30 0,20 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
4 0,20 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Table 12 Impact of the PIUS on the Trip Achievement Level (Numerical) 
 
It is shown that any unscheduled stop or emergency braking during the trip entails that the 
target Service Availability (99.8%) is not achieved, therefore PIUS can be considered a 
binary event. 
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6.5. Fault Tree Analysis 
This section provides the complete Fault Tree Analysis Model developed for the 
Preliminary Engineering RAM allocation of a LRT System. The analysis has been 
quantified and kept in a subsystem level, according to the failure modes identified in 
section 6.3. 
6.5.1. General Layout of the Service Availability Fault Tree 
The following FTA describes the direct relationship between Service Availability (SA) 
and the different Key Performance Indicators. The Service Availability (SA) is defined as 
a series; therefore it will be affected by a decrease of any of the Key Performance 
Indicators. 
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SERVICE AVAILABILITY
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6.5.2. Key Performance Indicators Modelling Techniques 
The following sub-sections develop the four Key Performance Indicators used in the 
previous section. The bottom events’ code in the following Fault Trees are Failure Modes 
Codes taken from the FMECA (section 6.3 of this document).  
6.5.2.1.    PIDT: Departure Times 
Quality Criteria for Departure Times is modelled as follows. Q (unavailability) and MTTF 
(Mean time to failure) are provided overleaf.  
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Figure 23 PIDT: Rail Signalling Failure Fault Tree 
 
Figure 24 PIDT: Traffic Lights Failure Fault Tree 
Q=4e-6 w=2e-6
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Figure 26  PIDT: AFC01 Failure of one validator machine Fault Tree 
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6.5.2.2.    PICS: Commercial Speed 
 



















Fire extinguisher sy stem




























































Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 
Cèlia Nadal Reales  75 
 
   
 
 
Figure 29  PICS: Power Failure Fault Tree 
 
Figure 30  PICS: Communications Failure Fault Tree 
Q=4e-6 w=2e-6
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Figure 32    PICS: Rail Signalling Failure Fault Tree 
 
Figure 33    PICS: Traffic Lights Failure Fault Tree 
Q=4e-6 w=2e-6
SIG02
Unable to detect switch position
Q=4e-6 w=2e-6
SIG04
















Possible LRV movement to












Proceed command is sent




Permissiv e aspect is display ed




Non permissiv e aspect is display ed





Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Study of a Light Rail Transit System 
Cèlia Nadal Reales  78 
 
6.5.2.3.    PITE: Train Evacuations 
Performance Indicator for Train Evacuations is modelled as follows. Q (unavailability) and MTTF (Mean time to failure) are provided. 
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6.5.2.4.    PIUS: Unscheduled Stops 
Performance Indicator for Unscheduled Stops is modelled as follows. Q (unavailability) and MTTF (Mean time to failure) are provided. 
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Figure 38 PIUS: Power Failure Fault Tree   
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6.5.3. Results 
The following table shows the quantified results of the Fault Tree Analysis
11
. The table 
includes individual contributions from all Performance Indicators. The system life time 








PIDT PICS PITE PIUS 
Unavailability (Q) 0.00120412 0.0009393 0.00073649 0.0003127 0.0004296 
Failure Frequency (W) 0.00092813 0.000732 0.0005388 0.0001311 0.0002536 
Expected Failures 193.09827 152.2929 112.1033 27.2785 52.7622 
Total Down Time (hours) 249.3998 194.5819 152.4714 64.7365 88.9467 
Total Up Time (hours) 207800.60 207855.41 207897.52 207985.26 207961.05 
MTBF (hours) 1077.4307 1366.1172 1855.8778 7626.8819 3943.1644 
MTTF (hours) 1076.1392 1364.8395 1854.4518 7624.5087 3941.4786 
MTTR (hours) 1.2916 1.2777 1.3601 2.3732 1.6858 
Service Availability 99.8796% 99.9061% 99.9264% 99.9687% 99.9570% 
Table 13 Service Availability results - quantified results of the Fault Tree Analysis
                                               
11
 Numerical results for the Fault Tree Analysis have been calculated by the FTA software used-
Item Software: Item Toolkit Fault Tree Analyses  
 http://www.itemsoft.com/fault_tree.html, according to the mathematical formulae of Kumamoto 
and Henley, [16]. See Appendix II for an unavailability quantification example. 
12
 That is 208050 h ( = 30 years x 365 days/year x 19h/day) 
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7. RAM Requirements Apportionment 
Qualitative RAM Requirements provide specifications for system and subsystem level 
about maintenance staff, maintenance operations, accessibility, ability to clean and wash, 
etc. 
RAM requirements have been derived from the Failure Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(Section 6.3) 
7.1. System RAM Requirements 
REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
RAM-001  




The overall Service Availability for the LRT shall be calculated as 
described in Section 4.2. 
General 
RAM-003  
The service availability shall be the same for all lines regardless of 
length or complexity. 
General 
RAM-004  
The Control System shall be able to automatically calculate the overall 
Service Availability (SA) for a given LRT and for a given period of 
time. 
General 
Table 14 System RAM Requirements 
7.2. Subsystem RAM Requirements  
REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
 NUMERICAL RAM TARGETS  
RAM-005  
The Contractor shall meet numerical RAM targets for the LRT 
subsystems specified in Section 6.3. 
General 
RAM-006  
The Contractor shall apportion their RAM targets contractually to any 
subcontractors or suppliers, if necessary. 
General 
 
QUALITATIVE RAM REQUIREMENTS 
 GENERAL MAINTAINABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Failure Diagnosis 
RAM-007  
The Control System shall inform the Operator of any failure, disruption 
or event that will degrade the performance of the system.  
General 
RAM-008  
The Control System shall inform the Maintainer of all detected failures, 
degraded and other conditions that require maintenance intervention.  General 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
RAM-009  
The Contractor shall identify with tags: cables, connectors, relay, 
switches, fuses, circuit breakers, test spots as well as any devices that the 
maintainer should have to manipulate. 
General 
 Maintenance Staff  
RAM-010  
All maintenance tasks other than heavy maintenance shall be able to be 
undertaken by one person including testing to bring into service.  
General 
 Maintenance Operations  
RAM-011  
The Contractor shall design the LRT system in order to facilitate 
cleaning and preventive maintenance operations. 
General 
RAM-012  
For equipment interfaced with the Public, the Contractor shall design 
solutions and typologies of materials that minimize cleaning operations 
and repair of damages. 
General 
RAM-013  




The Contractor shall design the LRT system in order to allow 




There shall be always a replacement part in stock for broken 
components. 
General 
 General Maintenance Requirements  
RAM-016  
The Contractor shall determine the logistical times and the MTTR in the 
recovery time calculations of the RAM predictions studies. 
General 
RAM-017  
The Contractor shall define in the maintainability prediction studies, the 




The Contractor's RAM predictions shall be validated by the actual 
measured RAM times. If the times measured during the tests are higher 
than the times predicted by the Contractor, the Contractor shall update 
the RAM studies, demonstrating that the overall Service Availability is 
still met. 
General 
RAM-019  Preventative maintenance shall be performed on all LRT equipment. General 
 Accessibility  
RAM-020  
The Contractor shall consider the actual travel and access times of LRT 




Main Power Supply 
RAM-021  
A loss of one of the main power supply incoming feeders shall be 
reported to the Main Power Supply Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-022  
Redundant incomers feed taps and redundant transformers shall enable 
the reconfiguration of the power supply in a short period of time (few 
seconds). 
Rail Systems 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
 Distribution Network  
RAM-023  
In case of failure, an alternative way within MV ring shall provide 
power. 
Rail Systems 
 Traction Power  
RAM-024  
A failure of one Transformer/Rectifier group shall be reported to the 
Traction Power Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-025  
A loss of one of the Traction Power incoming feeders shall be reported 
to the Traction Power Control System in the OCC via the Power and 
Traction Control RTU. 
Rail Systems 
 Overhead Catenary System (OCS)  
RAM-026  
An Overhead Catenary System (OCS) failure shall be reported to the 
OCC via the SCADA system. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-027  




A loss of energy at one OCS section shall be reported to the OCC via the 
SCADA system. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-029  An OCS support failure shall be reported to the OCC via the SCADA 
system.  
Rail Systems 
 Stray Current Control  
RAM-030  
Visual inspection and testing of the rail insulation shall be carried out in 
order to avoid leakage of stray currents. 
O&M 
RAM-031  
Running rails and the power supply negative pole shall be separated 
from the general ground (earth). 
Rail Systems 
 COMMUNICATIONS  
RAM-032  
A failure in information transmission shall be reported to the 
Communications Control system in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-033  
Communications equipment shall be designed to meet the specified 
availability targets for communication systems. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-034  
Wrong information transmission failures shall be reported to the 
Communications Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-035  Equipment shall be available to back-up system servers. Rail Systems 
RAM-036  




The proposed solution shall be future proof and be the latest hardware 
and software versions at build completion of the network. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-038  
The Contractor shall incorporate into the design of the system, all 
security features necessary to protect the network against cyber-attack 
and shall comply with ISO 27001 requirements. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-039  
The Contractor shall develop a disaster recovery Plan which shall 
include plans and facilities for recovering from major system incidents, 
such as providing off-site storage of backups. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-040  
It shall have common equipment in all location to ensure low 
maintainability 
Rail Systems 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
 Transmission Network  
RAM-041  
The transmission network shall be designed with enough redundancy so 
that a failure of the transmission network does not provoke a loss of 
signalling communication. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-042  There shall be redundant fibre optic routes for the transmission network. Rail Systems 
RAM-043  
All communications subsystems connected to the transmission network 
shall monitor the status and report network problems. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-044  
The Contractor shall determine the capacity of the network and shall 
provide capacity model to demonstrate that the proposed network design 
has been correctly sized to support the predicted service demand. 
Rail Systems 
 Radio Communications  
RAM-045  
Selective communication failures (communication between individuals 
or from point to point) shall be reported to the OCC by Operations and 
Maintenance staff. 
O&M 
 CCTV  
RAM-046  
The CCTV system shall be designed with high redundancy in critical 
areas (i.e. more than one camera for crossing, overlapping coverage). A 
single camera could be sufficient inside shelters. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-047  
Loss of video monitoring at road crossings shall be reported to the 
Communications Control System in the OCC. 
 
Rail Systems 
 ROLLING STOCK  
RAM-048  
Well proven and classical solutions shall be proposed in order to 
facilitate maintenance activities and to provide low lifecycle cost vehicle. 
Rolling Stock 
RAM-049  
Rolling Stock design shall ensure compliance with the mandatory laws 
and regulations applicable to hygiene and safety, in force on the date of 
commissioning of the Rolling Stock. 
Rolling Stock 
RAM-050  
The arrangements and materials used shall, as much as possible, deter 
hooligans from committing actions such as graffiti, lacerations, 




Screws shall be hidden and cannot be unscrewed or damage by 
passengers. All wires shall be protected and cannot be touched by 
passengers. 
Rolling Stock 
RAM-052  Lights shall be protected to avoid misuse passengers’ manipulations. Rolling Stock 
RAM-053  
All coverings of modular design shall be removed easily and quickly and 
are replaceable independent of one another during maintenance, while 
remaining difficult to remove by a non-specialist. 
Rolling Stock 
 Train Control System  
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
RAM-054  
The TCS shall detect and report to the OCC at least the following 
failures: 
·  RST01 - Defect in the door movement 
·  RST02 - Door opens whilst tram is moving 
·  RST05 - Inadequate train movement 
·  RST06 - Poor ride comfort 
·  RST07 - Reduced performance of the traction system 
·  RST08 - Failure of the traction system 
·  RST09 - Reduction of brake effectiveness 
·  RST10 - Loss of communications between train equipment 
·  RST11 - Loss of  electrical supply to auxiliary systems  
·  RST12 - Loss of pantograph 
·  RST13 - Failures that need the assistance of a technician 
·  RST14 - Failure of an HVAC unit 
Rolling Stock 
RAM-055  
An integrated software maintenance and diagnostic assistance system at 
driver’s and maintenance staff disposal is required to permit easy 
detection of any faults.  
Rolling Stock 
 OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTRE - OCC  
RAM-056  
In case of power failure, the data in each computer shall be saved until 
the power is restored.  
Rail Systems 
RAM-057  
All critical equipment and functions shall be identified and redundancy 
provided, backup and monitoring of such equipment and functions such 
that no single-point service affecting failure shall result in failure of a 
system essential for LRT operations. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-058  




Failure of the OCC equipment or breaking of the communication link 
shall not have effect on line equipment functions. Rail Systems 
 Operational Staff  
RAM-060  
Competence management, performance management and people 




Hierarchical operation levels shall be defined in order to minimize the 
time needed to recover from a human error/sabotage. 
O&M 
 SIGNALLING  
 Rail Signalling  
RAM-062  
All signalling equipment along the LRT line shall be monitored by the 
OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-063  All vehicles’ position on the LRT line shall be monitored by the OCC. Rail Systems 
RAM-064  Alarms of signalling system shall be received in the OCC. Rail Systems 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
RAM-065  
The local controls or the local manual command boxes should be used to 
service operation and manage incidents in case of: 
 failure to detect switch position, 
 failure of the interlocking, 
 non permissive aspect is displayed (trams are not allowed to 
proceed, when they should), 
 proceed aspect is displayed (trams are allowed to proceed, when 
they should not), 
 incorrect point machine position monitoring (uncontrolled 
routes of LRV on main line), 
 position of point machine is not controlled (LRV moves to an 
incorrect track section). 
O&M 
 Traffic Lights  
RAM-066  
The signalling system shall be designed to avoid single-point failures. 
Equipment with a single point of failure shall be avoided. 
Rail Systems 
 AUTOMATIC FARE COLLECTION (AFC)  
RAM-067  
Passengers shall be clearly informed of the failure of one validator 
machine, and prompted to use an alternative working unit.  
Rail Systems 
RAM-068  
The OCC must be requested to replace the faulty train for a working one 
as quick as possible.   
 
O&M 
 FIRE & LIFE SAFETY  
 Fire Extinguishing  
RAM-069  
The fire extinguishing system in substations, technical rooms, and stops 
shall be monitored by the local Fire Alarm Panel and the Fire Detection 
and Alarm System in the OCC via the SCADA system. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-070  




 TRACKWORKS  
RAM-071  
The guide-way components shall be designed in order to allow the 




All equipment and parts shall be standardized in order to achieve 
standardization with equipment from other suppliers.  
Civil and 
Structural 




Supervision, control and QA shall be applied during the construction 




Removal or replacement or repair of any components of the track 
structure (rails, fasteners, etc.) shall be carried out during non-operation 
hours, unless the track is closed due to failure, in which case repair 
should take place during Operating Hours. 
 
O&M 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
 Rail  
RAM-076  
Quality assurance processes and control shall be applied during rail 
manufacturing, implementation and mounting in order to avoid 








Ultrasonic and visual inspections shall be carried out on rails in order to 
detect fractures in rails due to fatigue and stress cracking. 
O&M 
RAM-079  
Implementation and rail mounting shall be carried out by qualified 
operators. 
O&M 
 Fasteners  
RAM-080  
Visual inspections shall be carried out in order to detect fasteners 
inadequately fixed during construction / maintenance. 
O&M 
 Gauge   
RAM-081  
Mechanical and Visual inspections are required during the testing and 
commissioning period and also after maintenance tasks, in order to 
detect failures in track gauge due to defective mounting and 
implementation. 
O&M 
Table 15 Subsystem RAM Requirements 
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8. Reliability Critical Items List 
8.1. Proposal of Preventive/Corrective Actions 
The Reliability Critical Items List defines those reliability critical failures with an impact 
on Service Availability or LRT Operation. In addition, this study provides possible design 
mitigations (Preventive/Corrective Actions). 
The Reliability Critical Items List has been kept to a functional level, following the 
critical failure selection done in the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (see 
section 6.3).  
The Reliability Critical Items List is a table with all failure modes that have been found to 
have an effect on the Service Availability, determining with Table 16 its severity and its 
frequency. With this two variables, the criticality can be set for each of the failures modes 
identified in the FMECA (Section 6.3) 
 









   
C5 C4 C3 C2 C1 
   
>2 h 
≥30 minutes < 
2 hour 
≥ 15 minutes 
<30 minutes 
≥ 2 minutes 
<15 minutes 
< 2 minutes 
Frequent F6 10 1 1 2 3 4 
Probable F5 1 1 2 3 4 5 
Occasional F4 0,1 2 3 4 5 6 
Remote F3 0,01 3 4 5 6 7 
Improbable F2 0,001 4 5 6 7 7 
Incredible F1 0,0001 5 6 7 7 7 
Table 16 Criticality definition for Reliability Critical Items List 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
RST11 
Failure to supply auxiliary systems. Loss 
of Heating, Ventilation and Air 
Conditioning (HVAC) functionality. 
Batteries provide emergency lighting and 
enables doors to continue to operate.  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Detrainment and train taken out of service 
F5 C5 1 
POW06 OCS failure 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Connect the OCS that failed to the substation. 
F4 C5 2 
POW07 OCS segment failure.  
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Change the OCS segment that failed. 
F4 C5 2 
POW08 Loss of energy at one OCS segment 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant substation system to enable system 
restoration in a short period of time (few seconds). 
F4 C5 2 
POW09 OCS pole failure 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Change the OCS pole and OCS segment that failed. 
F4 C5 2 
POW10 
Damage for galvanic corrosion of water 
or gas pipe under the track originates 
leak. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance.  
Mitigation in the design phase: Running rails and the power supply negative 
pole shall be separated from the general ground (earth). 
Corrective Actions: Repair the damaged pipes.  
F4 C5 2 
POW11 Dangerous step and/or touch potentials. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance.  
Mitigation in the design phase: Running rails and the power supply negative 
pole shall be separated from the general ground (earth). 
Corrective Actions: Action to be taken depending on the cause, which can be 
due to stray currents or circuit failure. 
F4 C5 2 
COM05 
Optical-fibre broken. 
Unable data transmission among all 
systems. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have redundant optical-fibre 
routes 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures 
F4 C5 2 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
COM07 Radio Controller failure. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have high redundancy and 
availability of Radio system. 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures 
F4 C5 2 
COM10 
Loss of video monitoring at road 
crossings. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have high redundancy and 
availability of CCTV system, more than one camera for crossing and 
overlapping coverage. 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures 
F5 C4 2 
RST07 Reduced performance. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F4 C5 2 
RST08 Propulsion system failure. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F4 C5 2 
RST09 Reduction or loss of brake effectiveness. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F5 C4 2 
RST13 
Exceptional failure in which it is 
impossible to continue the service without 
the assistance of a technician to recover 
the failed tram.  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F5 C4 2 
SIG12 
Manual operation of interlocking is not 
available. System inoperative. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C4 2 
SIG13 
Proceed command is sent both for road 
vehicles and for LRT. LRT during normal 
operation and road vehicles move to an 
intersection. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C4 2 
SIG14 
Stop command sent to LRT. LRT must 
stop at intersection. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C4 2 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
SIG15 
Permissive aspect is displayed. Road 
vehicles/pedestrians have permissive 
when they should not. (Failure of traffic 
regulator). 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C4 2 
SIG16 
Non permissive aspect is displayed. Road 
vehicles/pedestrians do not have 
permissive when they should. (Failure of 
traffic regulator). 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C4 2 
FLS01 
Fire extinguisher system fails to 
extinguish fire in substations or technical 
rooms. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance.  
Corrective Actions: Need for external extinguisher system. For the RAM 
Study a fire rate = 0.5 event/year has been used. 
F5 C4 2 
FLS02 
Fire extinguisher system fails to 
extinguish fire in stops. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance.  
Corrective Actions: Need for external extinguisher system. For the RAM 
Study a fire rate = 0.5 event/year has been used. 
F5 C4 2 
TRK02 
Fracture in rail due to fatigue and stress 
cracking. 
 
Preventive Actions: Routine inspections and maintenance during operation 
are required. 
Corrective Actions: Flash butt welds to be carried out by qualified welders. 
Supervision, control and QA during implementation, mounting and 
maintenance tasks. 
F4 C5 2 
POW01 
Loss of one of the Main Power Supply 
incoming feeders. 
 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant incomer feed taps and redundant 
transformers to enable the reconfiguration of the power supply in a short 
period of time (few seconds) 
F4 C4 3 
POW02 
Failure of one transformer or related 
protection. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant system to enable the reconfiguration of 
the power supply in a short period of time (few seconds) 
F4 C4 3 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
POW03 
Failure of the distribution of MV to 
Traction Power Substations. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant MV substation system to enable 
system restoration in a short period of time (few seconds).  
F4 C4 3 
POW04 
Failure of one Transformer/Rectifier 
Group 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant T/R system to enable system 
restoration in a short period of time (few seconds). 
F4 C4 3 
POW05 
Loss one of the Traction Power incoming 
feeders. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance. 
Corrective Actions: Design redundant incomer feeders to enable system 
restoration in a short period of time (few seconds). 
F4 C4 3 
COM01 
Failure in information transmission. 
Unable to establish communication 
between 2 or more system's areas. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have a high availability on 
communications 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F4 C4 3 
COM02 
Wrong information transmission. 
Wrong information give it between 2 or 
more system's areas. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have a high availability on 
communications 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F4 C4 3 
COM03 
Unable to manage communication 
information. 
Communication operator cannot access to 
the information. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have a high availability on 
communications 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F4 C4 3 
COM04 Loss of signalling communication. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have a redundant 
communication system 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F4 C4 3 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
COM06 
Loss of data integrity. 
Wrong data transmission among all 
systems. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: Design shall guarantee an integrity 
robustness solution 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures 
F4 C4 3 
COM08 Radio Base Station failure (zone affected)  
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have high redundancy and 
availability of Radio system 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F4 C4 3 
COM09 
Train selective radio communication 
failure. 
Preventive Actions: Routine maintenance  
Mitigation in the design phase: System shall have high redundancy and 
availability of on-board Radio system. 
Corrective Actions: Repair procedures. 
F5 C3 3 
RST04 
Loss of mechanical integrity or electrical 
continuity. 
Preventive Actions: Proper maintenance and inspections.  
Corrective Actions: Failure reported to the OCC and repair procedures taken. 
F3 C5 3 
RST05 
Fails to limit train movement from 
damaging track. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F4 C4 3 
RST06 The tram gives a poor ride comfort.  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F4 C4 3 
RST10 
Loss of communication between the train 
equipment (traction, brake, on-board 
signalling equipment, etc.). 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Train taken out of service at end of route 
F4 C4 3 
RST14 
Failure of one or more HVAC units 
requires passengers to be detrained and 
the train taken out of service due the 
challenging climate conditions 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Detrainment and train taken out of service 
F4 C4 3 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
RST15 
Failure of vehicle Fire and Life Safety 
(F&LS) system gives a false fire alarm. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Detrainment and train taken out of service 
F4 C4 3 
SIG01 
Unable to detect trains due to a failure on 
a tram detection device (Wayside Axle 
counters).  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG02 Unable to detect switch position. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG03 
Train detected in a track section where 
there is no LRT. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG04 
Unable to switch point machine (failure 
of interlocking).  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG05 Failure of the interlocking. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG06 
Permissive aspect is displayed. Trains 
have permissive when they should not. 
(Failure of interlocking). 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG07 
Non permissive aspect is displayed. 
Trains do not have permissive when they 
should. (Failure of interlocking) 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG08 
Proceed aspect is displayed. Trains have 
permissive when they should not (Failure 
of a signal)  
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
SIG09 
Incorrect point machine position 
monitoring. Uncontrolled routes of LRT. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG10 
Position of point machine is not 
controlled. LRT moves to an incorrect 
track section 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
SIG11 
Possible LRT movement to an incorrect 
track section. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance 
Corrective action: The local controls or the manual command boxes located 
locally can be used to service operation and manage incidents. 
F4 C4 3 
AFC01 
Failure of one validator machine (either 
check-in or check-out). Passengers need 
to use an alternative validator. 
This kind of failure may produce little interference with the service. The 
equipment will be held “off-line” and a signal will be produced to show the 
trouble (a beep, a red light, a message in the display, etc...).  
Moreover, the situation could be reinforced by the on-board Public Address 
(e.g. “Please, use the working validators” message) or Passenger Information 
System (displaying “Some validators are not working, please, use the working 
ones”). Regarding the passengers, it is considered that the impact may be 
small since passengers can use an alternative validator unit. 
F4 C4 3 
AFC02 
Failure of all validators or the 
concentrator (either check-in or check-
out). Passengers cannot validate their 
tickets. 
Passengers will be allowed to use the transport without validation (payment 
free) until the train ends the service reaching line’s head. OCC must be 
warned to replace the faulty train for a working one as quick as possible.   
F4 C4 3 
RST01 
Defect in the door movement which 
delays or prevents passengers boarding or 
alighting the tram. 
Preventive Actions: Proper maintenance and inspections. 
Corrective Actions: Failure reported to the OCC and repair procedures taken. 
F5 C2 4 
RST02 Door opens whilst tram is moving. 
Preventive Actions: Proper maintenance and inspections.  
Corrective Actions: Failure reported to the OCC and repair procedures taken. 
F5 C2 4 
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Failure Description (from FMECA) Preventive/Corrective Actions Frequency Severity Criticality 
RST03 Loss of mechanical integrity.  
Preventive Actions: Proper maintenance and inspections.  
Corrective Actions: Failure reported to the OCC and repair procedures taken. 
F3 C4 4 
RST12 Loss of pantograph. 
Preventive actions: Proper maintenance and testing 
Corrective action: Detrainment and train taken out of service 
F4 C3 4 
TRK01 
Manufacturing defects or defective 
mounting of rails. 
Preventive Actions: Periodic inspections and maintenance schedule.  
Corrective Actions: Specifications and Quality Procedures during 
manufacturing. Supervision and QA control during implementation and 
mounting. 
F3 C4 4 
TRK03 Resonance and excessive rail stresses. 
Preventive Actions: Scheduled inspection and maintenance of rail sections 
during operation are required. 
Corrective Actions: Grinding during non-operational hours. 
F3 C4 4 
TRK05 
Failure in track gauge due to defective 
mounting and implementation. 
Preventive Actions: Scheduled inspection and maintenance of rail sections 
during operation are required. 
Corrective Actions: Supervision, control and QA during construction and 
maintenance periods. Implementation and rail mounting to be carried out by 
qualified operators. 
F3 C4 4 
TRK04 
Fasteners inadequately fixed during 
construction or maintenance.  
Preventive Actions: Scheduled inspection and maintenance of rail sections 
during operation are required. 
Corrective Actions: Supervision, control and QA during construction/ 
maintenance periods. 
F3 C2 6 
Table 17 Proposal of Preventive/Corrective Actions 
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9. Economic Evaluation 
The only costs associated with this study are those related to the employee remuneration, 
software licenses, hardware equipment and energy consumption
13
. 
A summarizing table is presented below with the total cost and major budget items (more 
details can be found in the Budget Document itself.  
 
              ( ) 
Employee remuneration 12450 
Software licenses 6670 
Hardware expenses 2400 
Other costs 135 
Total  21655 € 
Table 18 Summary of the total cost of the study 
 
It is important to keep in mind that these values shall be taken as estimation because it 
can vary depending on different aspects such as the price per hour of the employee who 
develop the study, the computer used or the price of electricity consumption. 
 
Figure 41 Summary of study expenses 
Also note that “Other costs” such as power consumption and office material are almost 
negligible compared with the rest, being the main expenses those related with the 
remuneration of the engineering hours dedicated.  
                                               
13
 Note that the travels for client meetings are not included. 
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10. Analysis and Assessment of Environmental 
Implications  
This section is conceived in order to find out environmental implications derived from the 
“     b     , A     b          M        b      A             L                  S     ”. 
As its name indicates, it is a study and, for this reasons, it does not have direct 
environmental implications itself. 
As this document is a Preliminary Study for a project that its intention would be to allow 
the LRT system to be put in service, and therefore, to be operable after a design and its 
construction, the environmental implication taken into account are going to be those in 
which the LRT system would interact.  
The main goal for an urban transit system, such as LRT system, is to provide frequent and 
reliable services covering a dense developed area, providing as good accessibility as 
possible. So, with the development of the project that this document analyzes, the 
mobility of the area where the system is allocated will be solved. The decongestion of 
city traffic and mobility improving will provide a better quality of life. But this cannot 
happen alone. An environmental integration is absolutely required in order to make the 
LRT system be a part of a whole and not be one mean of transportation independent.  
For this reason, the environmental impact needs to be kept to a minimum, incorporating 
in the design of the tracks, stations, depot and associated structures/facilities.  
In order to have an efficient and effective LRT system, safe and secure, and also 
environmentally friendly, it is necessary to have environmental awareness, comply with 
regulations, use non-hazardous materials, control the air quality and noise and report 
environmental incidents so it can be treated and improved. 
The LRT System described in this document must preserve the natural environment of the 
city where it is emplaced. In this way, as it describes a segregated on-street LRT, its 
guideway would help to achieve a more sustainable environment with new trees 
plantation or grass, helping to be more visually attractive.  
As the ISO 14001 standard indicates, the system shall be designed to be capable of 
operate in site temperature conditions, but that cannot mean a worse material selection, as 
they have to minimize the deleterious effects of ultraviolet radiation. It shall be also 
electromagnetically compatible with its environment, as the system shall not produce 
electromagnetic emissions that interfere with the normal operation of electromagnetic 
devices or equipment used in and around the site. 
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10.1. Potential Environmental Impacts and Mitigation 
Measures 
The intention of the LRT System described in this document is to provide a reduction of 
vehicles by its establishment on the site and contribute to the diminishment of their 
associated air pollutant emissions.  
For this reason, it is need to present in this section, the environmental concern during the 
operation of the LRT system that include air and noise pollution, landscape and visual 
impact, between others.  
10.1.1. Air Quality 
On the next stage of this document, the LRT system analyzed would have to be 
constructed. Its construction will provoke dust generation from areas where the activity 
would be taken place. Such dust would have to be suppressed with water sprayers in 
order not to impact local population, sensitive habitats, species and existing buildings and 
structures near the project site.  
Also, in order to reduce air pollutant emissions from heavy equipment and machinery 
needed in the construction, fuels as much clean as possible will have to be used. And 
regular maintenance of machinery and vehicles take place.  
10.1.2. Geology 
During LRT system construction, changes in soil and groundwater system from 
excavation works would change or alter the existing natural soil.  
Restriction on movements of heavy traffic would be a mitigation measure to prevent this 
geological impact.  
10.1.3.  Noise and Vibration 
Noise impacts may arise as a result of traction motors, electric generator or noise from 
rolling stock. In the design, there would be mitigation measures such as isolation of the 
track to minimize both noise and vibration or noise barriers.  
10.1.4. Landscape 
Where the term stations have appeared in this document, they were specially designed in 
order to have as minimum as possible visual impact. Also, for the LRT rolling stock, 
sustainable materials and design would be incorporated.  
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10.1.5. Fire 
Although this item has been already treated in previous sections, it is important to notice 
that when a failure related to power takes place, in the design it has to be contemplated 
how this failure will interact with its environment. 
That means that near the OHS, traction power substations or other electrically related 
components, it would have to be firewall materials that would prevent its expansion if 
that failure happens and ends in a fire.  
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11. Planning and Scheduling 
11.1. Tasks identification 
A detailed list of tasks carried out during the study is presented below: 
A. INFORMATION RESEARCH 
A.1 Research of applicable guides and standards 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF WRITEN REPORT 
B.1 Aim, scope, requirements and justification 
B.2 RAM Discipline 
B.2.1 RAM Concepts 
B.3 Light Rail Transit (LRT) System 
B.3.1 Project Background 
B.3.2 System Breakdown Structure 
B.4 RAM Requirements 
B.4.1 Key Performance Indicators 
B.4.2 Methodology of Analysis 
B.4.3 Methods and Tools 
B.5 LRT RAM Analysis and Prediction 
B.5.1 Decision of chosen methods 
B.5.2 Critical system selection 
B.5.3 FMECA 
B.5.4 Sensitive Analysis on KPIs 
B.5.5 FTA 
B.6 RAM Requirements Apportionment 
B.7 Reliability Critical Items List 
B.8 Environmental Impact Study 
B.9 Conclusions and Recommendations 
B.10 Revision of the Report 
C. BUDGET 
C.1 Development of the budget 
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D. DELIVERY AND REVISION 
D.1 Provisional delivery 
D.2 Recommended modifications 
D.3 Final delivery 
E. ORAL PRESENTATION 
E.1 Preparation of oral presentation 
Table 19 Tasks Identification 
11.2. Brief tasks description 
A.1 Research of applicable guides and standards: Get knowledge enough over LRT 
System, Railway applications, System Analysis, Inductive Methods, Reliability, 
Maintainability and Risk, etc.  
B.1 Aim, scope, requirements and justification: Define the first important points of the 
report in order to develop the study over these objectives.   
B.2 RAM Discipline  
B.2.1 RAM Concepts: Explanation of RAM terms and concepts strongly related 
with RAM discipline. 
B.3 Light Rail Transit (LRT) System:  
B.3.1 Project Background: Description of the LRT project for which this study 
analyses the Service Availability (SA)  
B.3.2 System Breakdown Structure: Definition of different system levels for 
which activities have to be analyzed during the LRT project. 
B.4 RAM Requirements  
B.4.1 Key Performance Indicators: Explanation of the four quality criterion 
that would be essential to be able of measuring the Trip Achievement Level, and 
so, the SA. 
B.4.2 Methodology of Analysis: Description of the methodology of analysis that 
will be applied to the apportionment of RAM requirements for the LRT System in 
this study. 
B.4.3 Methods and Tools: Explanation of selected methods and tools that can 
be employed in the RAM analyses.  
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B.5 LRT RAM Analysis and Prediction 
B.5.1 Decision of chosen methods: Identification of the applicable methods to 
be used during the study from the previous described.  
B.5.2 Critical system selection: Identification of the systems to be analysed in 
order to fit the scope of the analysis. 
B.5.3 FMECA: Analysis of the possible effects of each failure on the System. 
B.5.4 Sensitive Analysis on KPIs: Justification to be able to model the SA using 
reliability modelling tools usually used in reliability analysis due to its binary 
events restriction. 
B.5.5 FTA: Development of complete Fault Tree Analysis Model developed for 
the Preliminary Engineering RAM allocation of a LRT System. 
B.6 RAM Requirements Apportionment: Qualitative RAM Requirements description 
to provide specifications for system and subsystem level. 
B.7 Reliability Critical Items List: Definition of reliability critical failures with an 
impact on Service Availability or LRT Operation. It also provides possible design 
mitigations (Preventive/Corrective Actions). 
B.8 Environmental Impact Study: Environmental implications related with the study. 
B.9 Conclusions and Recommendations: Summarize the main issues addressed in the 
study and make some conclusions and recommendations. 
B.10 Revision of the Report: review the entire document in order to correct the spelling 
mistakes and give it proper cohesion. 
C.1 Development of the budget: Develop a budget taking into account all aspects 
related to the development of this study.  
D.1 Provisional delivery: Delivery of the project in digital format.  
D.2 Recommended modifications: Inclusion of first review on format. 
D.3 Final delivery: Final delivery on June 2014. 
E.1 Preparation of oral presentation: Development of the presentation template and 
selection of the project information for a correct exposure in time and quality.  
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11.3. Interdependence relationship among tasks and effort 
Code 
of task 
Task description Preceding task 
Level of 
effort (h) 
A. Information Research   
A.1 Research of applicable guides and standards - 30 
B. Development of written report   
B.1 Aim, scope, requirements and justification A.1 10 
B.2 RAM Discipline 
B.2.1 RAM Concepts A.1, B.1 10 
B.3 Light Rail Transit (LRT) System 
B.3.1 Project Background A.1 8 
B.3.2 System Breakdown Structure A.1, B.3.1 10 
B.4 RAM Requirements 
B.4.1 Key Performance Indicators A.1, B.3 30 
B.4.2 Methodology of Analysis A.1, B.2, B.4.1 25 




B.5 LRT RAM Analysis and Prediction 
B.5.1 Decision of chosen methods B.4.3 5 





B.5.4 Sensitive Analysis on KPIs B.5.3 70 
B.5.5 FTA B.5.3 30 
B.6 RAM Requirements Apportionment B.5.5 40 
B.7 Reliability Critical Items List B.5.3, B.5.5 25 
B.8 Environmental Impact Study B.7 10 
B.9 Conclusions and Recommendations 
B.5., B.6,  
B.7, B.8 
10 
B.10 Revision of the Report B.9 5 
C. Budget   
C.1 Development of the budget B.9 20 
D. Delivery and Revision   
D.1 Provisional delivery C.1 1 
D.2 Recommended modifications D.1 10 
D.3 Final delivery D.2 1 
E. Oral presentation   
E.1 Preparation of oral presentation D.3 20 
Table 20 Relationship among tasks and effort 
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11.4. Gantt chart 
 
Figure 42 Gantt chart for study activities 
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On the previous Gantt diagram, one can see the development of the work in order to get this document. Moreover, on the following Gantt chart, it is 
represented the next stage tasks that could be done after this study. That means that although the study has been developed for an early and preliminary 
stage, a deeper and more detailed study can be done after the “     b     , A     b          M        b      Study      L                  S     ” using 
it as a base document in order to get more accurately to its actual extension.  
 
Figure 43 Gantt chart for next stage study activities 
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12. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Quantified results predict that the proposed design for the LRT System achieves a total 
Service Availability of 99.87%, therefore meeting the required Service Availability of 
99.8% established: 
   
∑(                      )
  
   (18)  
 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability requirements have been apportioned to LRT 
Systems and Subsystems by means of identified failure modes affecting the Service 
Availability and Service Interruption, and taking into account repair, access and logistic 
times.  
Due to the project’s size and complexity, it has been considered a good practice to 
develop a quantitative Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) to perform the LRT RAM Analysis and prediction. The system 
failure mode analysis has been carried out in terms of the Mean Time Between Service 
Affecting Failures (MTBSAF), identifying the effects of potential failures of the LRT 
Systems and Subsystems on the Key Performance Indicators driving the overall system 
Service Availability. 
Table 21 shows, over an estimated system lifetime of 30 years, the following data: 
 Unavailability (Q) 
 Failure Frequency (W) 
 Expected number of failures 
 Total Down Time (TDT) 
 Total Up Time (TUT) 
 Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
 Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) 
 Mean Time To Restore (MTTR) 
for each Key Performance Indicator and overall Service Availability:  
 PIDT: Departure Times – This performance indicator means that if the 
considered scheduled trip is performed or missed, taking into account the actual 
headway with the previous trip compared with the scheduled headway. 
 PICS: Commercial Speed – This performance indicator means that if the actual 
commercial speed of the train is lower, equal or higher than the scheduled 
commercial speed.  
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 PITE: Train Evacuations - This performance indicator considers a train 
evacuation when the train is evacuated between two stations during the trip.  






PIDT PICS PITE PIUS 
Unavailability (Q) 0.0012041 0.0009393 0.0007364 0.0003127 0.0004296 
Failure Frequency (W) 0.00092813 0.000732 0.0005388 0.0001311 0.0002536 
Expected Failures 193.09827 152.2929 112.1033 27.2785 52.7622 
Total Down Time (hours) 249.3998 194.5819 152.4714 64.7365 88.9467 
Total Up Time (hours) 207800.60 207855.41 207897.52 207985.26 207961.05 
MTBF (hours) 1077.4307 1366.1172 1855.8778 7626.8819 3943.1644 
MTTF (hours) 1076.1392 1364.8395 1854.4518 7624.5087 3941.4786 
MTTR (hours) 1.2916 1.2777 1.3601 2.3732 1.6858 
Service Availability 99.8796% 99.9061% 99.9264% 99.9687% 99.9570% 
Table 21 Service Availability summary 
 
So, in this study, a thorough sensitivity analysis of the impact of each Performance 
Indicator on the Trip Achievement Levels (TAL) has demonstrated that the Service 
Availability can be degraded by any single failure affecting the Key Performance 
Indicators. 
 
This study has been carried out as a Preliminary Engineering Study for the Light Rail 
Transit System. In order to implement this LRT System, it is recommended to follow the 
next step in the design which would be detailed design, production planning and tool 
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Appendix I: RAM Concepts 
System Architecture 
A system is a collection of components, arranged in various architectures, in order to 
perform the desired function. 
A system, or set of components, are said to be in a ‘series’ architecture if the failure of 
any component would cause the system to fail performing the desired function.  
 
 
Figure 44 S      ‘      ’              
A system or set of components are said to be in a ‘redundant’ (or parallel) architecture if 
the system can continue to perform the desired function if a component fails. 
 
 
Figure 45   S      ‘        ’ 1  2              
There are various redundancy architectures. However, the ones that are mostly used are:  
 One out of two (1oo2) where one component out of two must be functioning for 
the system to function 
 Two out of three (2oo3) where two components out of three must be functioning 
for the system to function 
 
A repairable system is one in which a failed component can be replaced, for example a 
bearing in a car.  
A non-repairable system is one in which a failed component cannot be replaced, for 
example a missile or a space craft.  
A non-repairable component is on that is disposed of, for example a light bulb or a brake 
pad. 
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System Failures 
System failures can be caused by a variety of different causes, or combination of causes, 
for example:  
 Equipment failure 
 Software errors 
 Environmental issues 
 Human errors 
Failures can be either random or systematic.  
Systematic failures are deterministic and are managed through engineering and quality 
management processes.  
Random failures are managed through component and system topology selection (e.g. 
redundancy) guided by probabilistic reliability modeling and reliability demonstration 
through observed failure data.  
It is the combination of reliability and maintainability which dictates the proportion of 
time that any system or component is available for use (availability), the key parameters 
being failure rate and downtime. 
Failure Rate 
Every component has a failure rate (λ) which is the number of components failing per 
unit time. This failure rate changes over the lifetime of the component:  
 Early failure period, where the component exhibits the ‘infant mortality rate’ 
which is primarily due to manufacturing defects or material weakness. Ideally 
these components are detected by the manufacturer through ‘burn in’ tests 
 Constant failure rate period, where the component can fail randomly (with equal 
probability)  
 Wear-out period, where the component has come to the end of its useful life and 
the failure rate starts increasing (no longer constant). Wear-out is due to such 
factors as ageing corrosion or fatigue. 
This is illustrated in Figure 46. The useful life of the component is where it exhibits a 
constant failure rate. Reliability modeling assumes a constant failure rate and for the 
reliability prediction to hold true, only components operating in this region should be 
deployed. That is, the component should be ‘burnt-in’ before installation and should be 
replaced before the wear out period commences. 
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It is essential that the reliability modeling assumptions are captured (as requirements 
requiring validation in the requirements management tool) and reflected into the 
operation and maintenance documentation. 
 
Figure 46  ‘B     b’                    
Reliability 
Reliability is defined as the probability that an item (system/component) can perform a 
required function under given conditions for a given time interval [1].  
It is expressed as a number between 0 and 1. It is represented by symbol 
 (     ).  
The reliability of a component operating within its useful life period and with a constant 
failure rate can be expressed as:  
    
      (19)  
 
Where:  
   = exponential function 
   = constant failure rate 
   = time 
The Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is a measure of reliability for repairable 
systems and is the arithmetic mean of the time between failures.  
     
 
 
   (20)  
Where:  
   is the constant failure rate 
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Other measures of reliability include:  
 Mean Cycles Between Failures (MCBF): this would be applicable, for systems 
such as platform screen doors or fare gate systems 
 Mean Kilometers Between Failures (MKMBF): this would be applicable to a 
rolling stock Service Affecting Failure 
 Service Affecting Failure: A failure that provokes that a train be withdrawn from 
service or a station be closed for use. 
Reliability Prediction 
Actual failure rate data is not available during the early phases of the life cycle and thus 
RAM actual performance cannot be measured. During these early life cycle phases, RAM 
assurance is based upon predictive analyses by modeling the design topology and 
applying failure rate information from equivalent systems / components.  
Prediction of system reliability through modeling based on failure rates generally reveals 
only very approximate reliability values. This is caused by:   
 Wide variability of the failure rates of identical components 
 Actual systems / components are not identical to those for which the failure rate 
data applies 
 Systems / components are not used in the same mode as that for which the failure 
rate data applies 
 Systems / components are not used in the same environment as that for which the 
failure rate data applies 
 Systems / components are not maintained in the same environment as that for 
which the failure rate data applies  
Therefore the degree of complexity of reliability modeling should be balanced against the 
expected accuracy and the modeling costs.  
The main benefit of reliability prediction modeling of complex systems is not in the 
absolute reliability estimate, but in the ability to model the system using different 
parameters to compare design approaches or topologies and identify critical elements. For 
example:  
 Component selection 
 Repair times 
 Redundancy arrangements 
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RAM predictive analysis shall be performed in concert with design, in order to inform 
design, and shall be complete prior to the completion of the design phase.  
Reliability prediction analysis estimates the system failure rate (λ), or mean time between 
failures, MTBF (1/λ) based upon system architecture and component failure rates.  
For redundant repairable systems, the reliability estimate depends on the repair times for 
the redundant components.  
Availability is then predicted based on mean time between failures and an estimate of the 
mean time to restore, MTTR, those failures. 
Availability 
Availability is defined as the ability of a product to be in a state to perform a required 
function under given conditions at a given instant of time or over time interval assuming 
that the required external resources are provided.  
It is expressed as a ratio or percentage and is represented as:  
  
               b               
          
 
∑   
∑     ∑   
   (21)  
Where:  
     = Up Time 
     = Down Time 
 
The Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) can be expressed as:  
     
          
   b              
   (22)  
 
And the Mean Down Time (   ):  
    
∑   
                  
   (23)  
 
Availability can then be expressed as:  
  
    
        
   (24)  
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Maintainability 
Maintainability is defined as the probability that a given active maintenance action, for an 
item under given conditions of use can be carried out within a stated time interval when 
the maintenance is performed under stated conditions and using stated procedures and 
resources.  
Maintainability is the ease with which repairs and other maintenance work can be carried 
out. Maintenance activities can be either:  
 Corrective maintenance (repair), where maintenance is required to restore a 
system from a failed to an operational state. Corrective maintenance is quantified 
as the mean time to restore (MTTR) 
 Preventive maintenance, which seeks to retain the system in an operational or 
available state and test for undetected failures.  
Both corrective and preventative maintenance directly affect availability. The time taken 
to repair failures and the time taken for routine preventative maintenance can remove the 
systems from the available state.  
Maintainability is directly governed by design. The design determines such features as:  
 Accessibility of equipment  
 Ease of test and diagnosis 
 Ease of repair and calibration 
 The level of skill required 
 The periodicity of preventative maintenance 
 The need for specialist tools / equipment
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Appendix II: MTTF Failure Model Quantification 
MTTF is Mean Time to Failure. MTTF Model is a time based model and assumes 
constant failure rate in terms of failures per hour over the life time of the system. Here the 
failure rate and the repair rate are given by: 
  
 
    
 
 
  (25)  
MTTR to repair rate: 
  
 
    
 
 
  (26)  
Unavailability at time t, or Lifetime: 
 ( )  
 
   
[    (   ) ] 
 
  (27)  
Failure Frequency at time t, or Lifetime: 
 ( )  (   ( ))  
 
  (28)  
Where: 
 ( )                           
 ( )                              
                          
                         
                         
                        
And: 
 
               
               
 
  (29)  
Where: 
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Numerical results for the Fault Tree Analysis have been calculated by the FTA software 
used: Item Software - Item Toolkit Fault Tree Analyses; 
http://www.itemsoft.com/fault_tree.html, 
according to the mathematical formulae of Kumamoto and Henley, [16]. 
 
An unavailability quantification example is provided in Table 22 for failure mode 
COM04 - Loss of signalling communication. 
 
COM04 
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Enable backup of system servers 
COM11 
Wrong data storage. Unable to storage correctly all 
servers information. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
COM12 
Failure data storage. Unable to storage all servers 
information. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
Telephone 
Provide voice communications  COM13 
Telephone does not work properly in with the 
elevator. 
Unable to establish voice communication by 
Telephone with the elevator 
No No No No N/A N/A 
Provide acoustic signalling and visual 
signalling. 
COM14 Unable to do calls out of the system. No No No No N/A N/A 
Communicate with external 
emergency departments  
COM15 
Unable to establish voice communication with 
external emergency departments 




Show visual passenger information 
(such as late arrival, commercial ads, 
…) 
COM17 
PIS show wrong message. Wrong visual 
information showed. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
COM18 
PIS out of service. Unable to show visual 
information. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
Update automatically the incoming 
tram information (estimated time of 
arrival of the next tram and terminal 
station) 
COM19 
PIS show wrong message. Wrong visual 
information showed. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
COM20 
PIS out of service. Unable to show visual 
information 
No No No No N/A N/A 
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DT CS TE US 
Multiservice 
Network 
Transmit time signal (through 
transmission network) to the clock 
equipment, PIDs, AFC machines, 
CCTV equipment along light rail tram 
system 
COM21 
Unable transmit time signal. Loss of correct time 
reference. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
CCTV 
Video monitoring at stops, depots, 
wayside and on-board 
COM23 Loss of video monitoring at stops, depots No No No No N/A N/A 
COM24 Loss of video monitoring on-board rolling stock. No No No No N/A N/A 
Monitor people movement (stations, 
substations, OCC, elevator and depot) 
COM25 Camera broken. Unable to transmit visual images No No No No N/A N/A 
COM26 Camera dirty. Bad images transmitted. No No No No N/A N/A 
Provide human-CCTV interface 
COM27 Screen broken. Unable to see visual images. No No No No N/A N/A 
COM28 
Wrong screen performance. Bad quality images 
transmitted 
No No No No N/A N/A 
Public 
Address (PA) 




 Lifts & 
Escalators 
Ingress / egress from different 
building's levels  
MEP01 Lifts & Escalators failure No No No No N/A N/A 





AFC Vending / Payment functionality AFC03 
Failure at vending / payment process. Commercial 
transaction can't be done. 
No No No No N/A N/A 
Table 23 Subsystems Not Affecting Service Availability 
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Heating, Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning (HVAC) 
 
Source: http://ttmrail.com.au/hvac.php 
Fire Detection and Alarm 
 
Source: http://www.epotos.com/home/helpful-information/ 
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Table 24 Graphic Description of FMECA Subsystems 
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Appendix V: Impact of the PIDT for Different Delay Times 
Table 25 Impact of the PIDT on the TAL (Numerical) for different Delay times - 9 minutes headway 
 
  Performance Indicator for Departure Times (PIDT) 
    OFF-PEAK HOURS - 9 minutes headway 
Units Tens of seconds 
Delay  
(sec) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
0 1,000 0,981 0,963 0,944 0,926 0,907 0,889 0,870 0,852 0,833 0,815 0,796 0,778 0,759 0,741 0,722 0,704 0,685 0,667 0,648 0,630 0,611 0,593 0,574 0,556 0,537 0,519 0,500 0,481 0,463 0,444 
1 0,998 0,980 0,961 0,943 0,924 0,906 0,887 0,869 0,850 0,831 0,813 0,794 0,776 0,757 0,739 0,720 0,702 0,683 0,665 0,646 0,628 0,609 0,591 0,572 0,554 0,535 0,517 0,498 0,480 0,461 0,443 
2 0,996 0,978 0,959 0,941 0,922 0,904 0,885 0,867 0,848 0,830 0,811 0,793 0,774 0,756 0,737 0,719 0,700 0,681 0,663 0,644 0,626 0,607 0,589 0,570 0,552 0,533 0,515 0,496 0,478 0,459 0,441 
3 0,994 0,976 0,957 0,939 0,920 0,902 0,883 0,865 0,846 0,828 0,809 0,791 0,772 0,754 0,735 0,717 0,698 0,680 0,661 0,643 0,624 0,606 0,587 0,569 0,550 0,531 0,513 0,494 0,476 0,457 0,439 
4 0,993 0,974 0,956 0,937 0,919 0,900 0,881 0,863 0,844 0,826 0,807 0,789 0,770 0,752 0,733 0,715 0,696 0,678 0,659 0,641 0,622 0,604 0,585 0,567 0,548 0,530 0,511 0,493 0,474 0,456 0,437 
5 0,991 0,972 0,954 0,935 0,917 0,898 0,880 0,861 0,843 0,824 0,806 0,787 0,769 0,750 0,731 0,713 0,694 0,676 0,657 0,639 0,620 0,602 0,583 0,565 0,546 0,528 0,509 0,491 0,472 0,454 0,435 
6 0,989 0,970 0,952 0,933 0,915 0,896 0,878 0,859 0,841 0,822 0,804 0,785 0,767 0,748 0,730 0,711 0,693 0,674 0,656 0,637 0,619 0,600 0,581 0,563 0,544 0,526 0,507 0,489 0,470 0,452 0,433 
7 0,987 0,969 0,950 0,931 0,913 0,894 0,876 0,857 0,839 0,820 0,802 0,783 0,765 0,746 0,728 0,709 0,691 0,672 0,654 0,635 0,617 0,598 0,580 0,561 0,543 0,524 0,506 0,487 0,469 0,450 0,431 
8 0,985 0,967 0,948 0,930 0,911 0,893 0,874 0,856 0,837 0,819 0,800 0,781 0,763 0,744 0,726 0,707 0,689 0,670 0,652 0,633 0,615 0,596 0,578 0,559 0,541 0,522 0,504 0,485 0,467 0,448 0,430 
9 0,983 0,965 0,946 0,928 0,909 0,891 0,872 0,854 0,835 0,817 0,798 0,780 0,761 0,743 0,724 0,706 0,687 0,669 0,650 0,631 0,613 0,594 0,576 0,557 0,539 0,520 0,502 0,483 0,465 0,446 0,428 
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Performance Indicator for Departure Times (PIDT) 
    OFF-PEAK HOURS - 6 minutes headway 
Units Tens of seconds 
Delay  
(sec) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
0 1,000 0,973 0,947 0,923 0,900 0,878 0,857 0,837 0,818 0,800 0,783 0,766 0,750 0,735 0,720 0,706 0,692 0,679 0,667 0,655 0,643 0,632 0,621 0,610 0,600 0,590 0,581 0,571 0,563 0,554 0,545 
1 0,997 0,970 0,945 0,921 0,898 0,876 0,855 0,835 0,816 0,798 0,781 0,764 0,748 0,733 0,719 0,705 0,691 0,678 0,665 0,653 0,642 0,630 0,620 0,609 0,599 0,589 0,580 0,571 0,562 0,553 0,545 
2 0,994 0,968 0,942 0,918 0,896 0,874 0,853 0,833 0,814 0,796 0,779 0,763 0,747 0,732 0,717 0,703 0,690 0,677 0,664 0,652 0,641 0,629 0,619 0,608 0,598 0,588 0,579 0,570 0,561 0,552 0,544 
3 0,992 0,965 0,940 0,916 0,893 0,872 0,851 0,831 0,813 0,795 0,778 0,761 0,745 0,730 0,716 0,702 0,688 0,675 0,663 0,651 0,639 0,628 0,617 0,607 0,597 0,587 0,578 0,569 0,560 0,551 0,543 
4 0,989 0,963 0,938 0,914 0,891 0,870 0,849 0,829 0,811 0,793 0,776 0,759 0,744 0,729 0,714 0,700 0,687 0,674 0,662 0,650 0,638 0,627 0,616 0,606 0,596 0,586 0,577 0,568 0,559 0,550 0,542 
5 0,986 0,960 0,935 0,911 0,889 0,867 0,847 0,828 0,809 0,791 0,774 0,758 0,742 0,727 0,713 0,699 0,686 0,673 0,661 0,649 0,637 0,626 0,615 0,605 0,595 0,585 0,576 0,567 0,558 0,550 0,541 
6 0,984 0,957 0,933 0,909 0,887 0,865 0,845 0,826 0,807 0,789 0,773 0,756 0,741 0,726 0,711 0,698 0,684 0,672 0,659 0,647 0,636 0,625 0,614 0,604 0,594 0,584 0,575 0,566 0,557 0,549 0,541 
7 0,981 0,955 0,930 0,907 0,885 0,863 0,843 0,824 0,805 0,788 0,771 0,755 0,739 0,724 0,710 0,696 0,683 0,670 0,658 0,646 0,635 0,624 0,613 0,603 0,593 0,583 0,574 0,565 0,556 0,548 0,540 
8 0,978 0,952 0,928 0,905 0,882 0,861 0,841 0,822 0,804 0,786 0,769 0,753 0,738 0,723 0,709 0,695 0,682 0,669 0,657 0,645 0,634 0,623 0,612 0,602 0,592 0,583 0,573 0,564 0,556 0,547 0,539 
9 0,976 0,950 0,925 0,902 0,880 0,859 0,839 0,820 0,802 0,784 0,768 0,752 0,736 0,721 0,707 0,694 0,681 0,668 0,656 0,644 0,633 0,622 0,611 0,601 0,591 0,582 0,572 0,563 0,555 0,546 0,538 
Table 26 Impact of the PIDT on the TAL (Numerical) for different Delay times - 6 minutes headway 
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Table 27 Impact of the PIDT on the TAL (Numerical) for different Delay times - 3 minutes headway
Performance Indicator for Departure Times (PIDT) 
    PEAK HOURS - 3 minutes headway 
Units Tens of seconds 
Delay 
(sec) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
0 1,000 0,947 0,900 0,857 0,818 0,783 0,750 0,720 0,692 0,667 0,643 0,621 0,600 0,581 0,563 0,545 0,529 0,514 0,500 0,486 0,474 0,462 0,450 0,439 0,429 0,419 0,409 0,400 0,391 0,383 0,375 
1 0,994 0,942 0,896 0,853 0,814 0,779 0,747 0,717 0,690 0,664 0,641 0,619 0,598 0,579 0,561 0,544 0,528 0,513 0,499 0,485 0,472 0,460 0,449 0,438 0,428 0,418 0,408 0,399 0,390 0,382 0,374 
2 0,989 0,938 0,891 0,849 0,811 0,776 0,744 0,714 0,687 0,662 0,638 0,616 0,596 0,577 0,559 0,542 0,526 0,511 0,497 0,484 0,471 0,459 0,448 0,437 0,427 0,417 0,407 0,398 0,390 0,381 0,373 
3 0,984 0,933 0,887 0,845 0,807 0,773 0,741 0,711 0,684 0,659 0,636 0,614 0,594 0,575 0,557 0,541 0,525 0,510 0,496 0,483 0,470 0,458 0,447 0,436 0,426 0,416 0,406 0,397 0,389 0,381 0,373 
4 0,978 0,928 0,882 0,841 0,804 0,769 0,738 0,709 0,682 0,657 0,634 0,612 0,592 0,573 0,556 0,539 0,523 0,508 0,495 0,481 0,469 0,457 0,446 0,435 0,425 0,415 0,405 0,396 0,388 0,380 0,372 
5 0,973 0,923 0,878 0,837 0,800 0,766 0,735 0,706 0,679 0,655 0,632 0,610 0,590 0,571 0,554 0,537 0,522 0,507 0,493 0,480 0,468 0,456 0,444 0,434 0,424 0,414 0,404 0,396 0,387 0,379 0,371 
6 0,968 0,918 0,874 0,833 0,796 0,763 0,732 0,703 0,677 0,652 0,629 0,608 0,588 0,570 0,552 0,536 0,520 0,506 0,492 0,479 0,466 0,455 0,443 0,433 0,423 0,413 0,404 0,395 0,386 0,378 0,370 
7 0,963 0,914 0,870 0,829 0,793 0,759 0,729 0,700 0,674 0,650 0,627 0,606 0,586 0,568 0,550 0,534 0,519 0,504 0,490 0,477 0,465 0,453 0,442 0,432 0,422 0,412 0,403 0,394 0,385 0,377 0,370 
8 0,957 0,909 0,865 0,826 0,789 0,756 0,726 0,698 0,672 0,647 0,625 0,604 0,584 0,566 0,549 0,533 0,517 0,503 0,489 0,476 0,464 0,452 0,441 0,431 0,421 0,411 0,402 0,393 0,385 0,377 0,369 
9 0,952 0,905 0,861 0,822 0,786 0,753 0,723 0,695 0,669 0,645 0,623 0,602 0,583 0,564 0,547 0,531 0,516 0,501 0,488 0,475 0,463 0,451 0,440 0,430 0,420 0,410 0,401 0,392 0,384 0,376 0,368 
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Table 28 Impact of the PIDT on the TAL (Numerical) for different Delay times - 2 minutes headway
Performance Indicator for Departure Times (PIDT) 
    PEAK HOURS - 3 minutes headway 
Units Tens of seconds 
Delay 
 (sec) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
0 1,000 0,923 0,857 0,800 0,750 0,706 0,667 0,632 0,600 0,571 0,545 0,522 0,500 0,480 0,462 0,444 0,429 0,414 0,400 0,387 0,375 0,364 0,353 0,343 0,333 0,324 0,316 0,308 0,300 0,293 0,286 
1 0,992 0,916 0,851 0,795 0,745 0,702 0,663 0,628 0,597 0,569 0,543 0,519 0,498 0,478 0,460 0,443 0,427 0,412 0,399 0,386 0,374 0,363 0,352 0,342 0,332 0,323 0,315 0,307 0,299 0,292 0,285 
2 0,984 0,909 0,845 0,789 0,741 0,698 0,659 0,625 0,594 0,566 0,541 0,517 0,496 0,476 0,458 0,441 0,426 0,411 0,397 0,385 0,373 0,361 0,351 0,341 0,331 0,323 0,314 0,306 0,299 0,291 0,284 
3 0,976 0,902 0,839 0,784 0,736 0,694 0,656 0,622 0,591 0,563 0,538 0,515 0,494 0,474 0,456 0,440 0,424 0,410 0,396 0,383 0,372 0,360 0,350 0,340 0,331 0,322 0,313 0,305 0,298 0,291 0,284 
4 0,968 0,896 0,833 0,779 0,732 0,690 0,652 0,619 0,588 0,561 0,536 0,513 0,492 0,472 0,455 0,438 0,423 0,408 0,395 0,382 0,370 0,359 0,349 0,339 0,330 0,321 0,313 0,305 0,297 0,290 0,283 
5 0,960 0,889 0,828 0,774 0,727 0,686 0,649 0,615 0,585 0,558 0,533 0,511 0,490 0,471 0,453 0,436 0,421 0,407 0,393 0,381 0,369 0,358 0,348 0,338 0,329 0,320 0,312 0,304 0,296 0,289 0,282 
6 0,952 0,882 0,822 0,769 0,723 0,682 0,645 0,612 0,583 0,556 0,531 0,508 0,488 0,469 0,451 0,435 0,420 0,405 0,392 0,380 0,368 0,357 0,347 0,337 0,328 0,319 0,311 0,303 0,296 0,288 0,282 
7 0,945 0,876 0,816 0,764 0,719 0,678 0,642 0,609 0,580 0,553 0,529 0,506 0,486 0,467 0,449 0,433 0,418 0,404 0,391 0,379 0,367 0,356 0,346 0,336 0,327 0,318 0,310 0,302 0,295 0,288 0,281 
8 0,938 0,870 0,811 0,759 0,714 0,674 0,638 0,606 0,577 0,550 0,526 0,504 0,484 0,465 0,448 0,432 0,417 0,403 0,390 0,377 0,366 0,355 0,345 0,335 0,326 0,317 0,309 0,302 0,294 0,287 0,280 
9 0,930 0,863 0,805 0,755 0,710 0,670 0,635 0,603 0,574 0,548 0,524 0,502 0,482 0,463 0,446 0,430 0,415 0,401 0,388 0,376 0,365 0,354 0,344 0,334 0,325 0,317 0,308 0,301 0,293 0,286 0,280 
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Appendix VI: Subsystem RAM Requirements 
This appendix has been created in order to describe RAM Requirements that LRT Subsystems 
do not affect any of the Key Performance Indicators (See Appendix III: FMECA – Subsystems 
Not Affecting SA) 
 
REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
 COMMUNICATIONS  
RAM-082  
Wrong data storage during a backup of system servers shall be reported to the 
Communications Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-083  






A failure to establish voice communication by telephone with the elevator shall be 




A failure to provide acoustic or visual signalling on incoming telephone calls 
shall be reported to the Communications Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-086  There shall be redundancy of public telephony providers. Rail Systems 
RAM-087  
A failure of the line with Emergency Services shall be reported to the 
Communications Control System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-088  There shall be a backup for the line with Emergency Services. Rail Systems 
 
Passenger Information Systems  
RAM-089  
PIS out of service failure shall be reported to the Communications Control 
System in the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-090  
After failure of the PIS system, the PA system should be used to provide 
information to passengers. 
O&M 
 
Transmission Network  
RAM-091  





RAM-092  Loss of video monitoring on-board rolling stock shall be reported to the OCC. Rail Systems 
RAM-093  




Any camera suffering an image degradation that is noticeable to the OCC 
operators shall be reported to the OCC. 
Rail Systems 
RAM-095  A broken CCTV screen shall be reported to the OCC. O&M 
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT TEXT DISCIPLINE 
RAM-096  
A CCTV screen showing bad performance (bad quality images transmitted) shall 
be reported to the OCC. 
O&M 
 
Public Address (PA)  
RAM-097  
The Public Address system shall be designed with enough redundancy, so that a 
single PA failure does not provoke a loss of audio announcements. 
Rail Systems 
 
MECHANICAL / ELECTRICAL /  PLUMBING (MEP) 
 
Lifts & Escalators 
RAM-098  
A lifts or escalators failure shall be reported to the Stops local Building 




RAM-099  A plumbing failure shall be reported by the Operations and Maintenance Staff. O&M 
Table 29 Subsystems RAM Requirements 
 
 
 
 
